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Come Shale Away: Navigating the
“Business Friendliness” of Regulatory
Environments in the Marcellus Shale
and Albertan Oil Sands
By Jivaji Moré*
Abstract: In today’s often-tumultuous economic climate, the appeal of
investment in North America’s unconventional fossil fuel “revolution” has
remained both consistent and strong. In the United States, countless energy
companies have focused on extracting natural gas from deposits of shale rock.
In Canada, firms have sought to turn deposits of bituminous “oil sands” into a
secure, domestic source of synthetic crude oil. But where, if given a choice
between the two countries, might a firm otherwise indifferent to extracting
natural gas or oil choose to drill? This Comment attempts to answer this
question by analyzing federal, state/provincial, and local/municipal regulatory
regimes in Pennsylvania, United States (home of the vast Marcellus Shale play)
and Alberta, Canada (home to most of Canada’s oil sands). Ultimately, this
Comment isolates three main differences between the regulatory regimes
governing these two regions, and concludes that, at least in the near term,
regulations in Alberta and the oil sands are more “business friendly” to
potential developers than those in Pennsylvania and the Marcellus Shale.

* J.D. Candidate, 2013, Northwestern University School of Law; B.A., Political Science,
2008, Columbia University. Many thanks to my editors for their help and input.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On October 16, 2011, Kinder Morgan, Inc. agreed to purchase rival oil
and gas pipeline operator El Paso Corp. for $38 billion in cash, stock, and
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assumed debt.1 The transaction gave Kinder Morgan access to a variety of
pipeline assets, leaving it with a dominant position in North American
natural gas distribution, as well as control over the flow of crude oil from
Canada to the west coast of the United States. 2 It was the largest announced
merger of 2011—a deal indicative of the appeal and promise of North
America’s unconventional fossil fuel resources to investors, even in today’s
tumultuous economy. 3
Oil and natural gas extracted from shale rock, and crude oil derived
from Canada’s “oil sands” are perhaps the unconventional fossil fuels of
greatest interest to Kinder Morgan and its peers. 4 Unlike more traditional
forms of oil and natural gas, these unconventional resources are not trapped
inside vast underground reservoirs of rock.5 Instead, they exist within
individual rocks themselves, and must be extracted through processes that
can be more difficult and costly than those used to extract conventional oil
and gas.6 As these techniques have gained economic7 and technological8
viability in recent years, the development of North American shale and oil
sands reserves has exploded. In the eyes of many, North America is

1

Michael J. De La Merced & Clifford Krauss, Kinder Morgan to Buy El Paso for $21.1
Billion,
DEALBOOK
(Oct.
16,
2011,
9:53
PM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/10/16/kinder-morgan-to-buy-el-paso/. The deal became
effective on May 24, 2012. Kinder Morgan and El Paso Announce Planned Closing Date of
May
24,
2012,
BUS.
WIRE
(May
10,
2012,
11:20
AM),
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20120510006271/en/Kinder-Morgan-El-PasoAnnounce-Planned-Closing.
2
De La Merced & Krauss, supra note 1.
3
Press Release, Mergermarket, Mergermarket M&A Round-up for Year End 2011, at 3
(Jan. 3, 2012), http://www.mergermarket.com/pdf/Press-Release-for-Financial-AdvisersYear-End-2011.pdf.
4
See De La Merced & Krauss, supra note 1.
5
GENE WHITNEY ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40872, U.S. FOSSIL FUEL RESOURCES,
TERMINOLOGY,
REPORTING,
AND
SUMMARY
6
(2010),
available
at
http://epw.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Files.view&FileStore_id=04212e22c1b3-41f2-b0ba-0da5eaead952. Geologically speaking, conventional oil and gas resources
migrate from within the “source rock” from which they have originated to underground
reservoirs, while unconventional resources remain within the source rock. Press Release,
U.S. Geological Survey, USGS Releases First Assessment of Shale Resources in the Utica
Shale:
38
Trillion
Cubic
Feet
(Oct.
4,
2012),
http://www.usgs.gov/newsroom/article.asp?ID=3419&from=rss_home.
6
WHITNEY ET AL., supra note 5.
7
See DAN WOYNILLOWICZ ET AL., PEMBINA INST., OIL SANDS FEVER: THE
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPLICATIONS OF CANADA’S OIL SANDS RUSH 2–3 (2005), available at
pubs.pembina.org/reports/oilsands72.pdf (discussing the government of Alberta’s campaign
to attract drillers to the oil sands). The economic viability of oil sands excavation will be
discussed at greater length later in this Comment.
8
WHITNEY ET AL., supra note 5. For a detailed discussion of the technological advances
of shale gas extraction, see infra Part II.A.
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currently in the midst of an energy “revolution.”9
The impacts of this revolution have so far been resounding. North
America now holds vast quantities of two of the world’s important fossil
fuels.10 Extraction is still on the rise, and as acquisition activity suggests,
the playing field in both the United States and Canada is wide open for
future development. 11
Further, notwithstanding periodic short-term price changes, both shale
gas and oil sands crude are resources for which there is likely to be strong
demand.12 Moreover, both resources are located within North America’s
borders and are thus more secure than many of the United States and
Canada’s traditional sources for fossil fuels, such as the Middle East and
Africa. As Canada’s Prime Minister Stephen Harper recently suggested,
there is considerable economic value in having a stake in the democratic
world’s largest supply of “ethical oil.”13
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the continued exploitation of
North American shale plays and oil sands deposits fuels a strong engine for
economic growth. Simply put, the development of these resources creates
9

While the term “revolution” has been commonly associated with the recent explosion
in shale gas supply, see, e.g., David Brooks, Editorial, The Shale Gas Revolution, N.Y.
TIMES,
Nov.
4,
2011,
at
A31,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/04/opinion/brooks-the-shale-gas-revolution.html,
this
Comment contends that the term is equally applicable to the oil sands of Western Canada.
10
North America holds over 80% of the world’s oil sands reserves, with 53.7 billion
barrels of oil in the United States and over 1.6 trillion in Canada. MARC HUMPHRIES ET AL.,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34258, NORTH AMERICAN OIL SANDS: HISTORY OF
DEVELOPMENT, PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE 2–4 (2008), available at
www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL34258.pdf. Meanwhile, the United States and Canada have a
combined 55 trillion cubic meters of unconventional natural gas reserves (37 trillion for the
United States and 18 trillion for Canada), more than any individual country in the world. See
An
Unconventional
Bonanza,
ECONOMIST
(July
14,
2012),
http://www.economist.com/node/21558432 (displaying this information graphically). As
Canada has more oil sands than the United States, and the United States has more
unconventional gas than Canada, this Comment generally associates the oil sands with
Canada and shale deposits with the United States.
11
See, e.g., Mark Scott, Energy Deals See an Upswing as Bargains Abound, DEALBOOK
(Oct. 17, 2011, 4:40 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/10/17/behind-the-surge-inenergy-deals-2/.
12
According to the International Energy Agency (an independent organization focused
on monitoring world energy trends), world oil consumption is expected to rise by more than
13% between 2010 and 2035. Press Release, Int’l Energy Agency, The World is Locking
Itself into an Unsustainable Energy Future Which Would have Far Reaching Consequences
(Nov.
9,
2011),
http://www.iea.org/newsroomandevents/pressreleases/2011/november/name,20318,en.html.
Global demand for natural gas is also expected to rise during this period. Id.
13
See Louise Egan, Canada PM Applauds Job Creation, Defends Oil Sands, REUTERS
(Jan. 7, 2011, 1:46 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/01/07/us-economy-harperidUSTRE7064CT20110107.
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jobs, often in communities where job creation is sorely needed. 14 In total,
the shale industry has already created half a million jobs in the United
States.15 Reports suggest that an additional 870,000 shale-industry jobs
may be added by 2015.16 Meanwhile, development of the oil sands has
helped Canada recoup the majority of the jobs it lost during the 2009
recession.17 The job creating potential of shale gas and oil sands activity is
not insignificant, especially as North America’s economies have entered a
“new normal” of higher unemployment, lower standard of living, and
minimal growth.18
This Comment begins with the premise that North America’s
unconventional fossil fuel revolution should be encouraged. It seeks to
identify regulatory hurdles in the United States and Canada that potentially
limit fossil-fuel development, and it asks if these hurdles might impact the
behavior of a hypothetical energy company otherwise indifferent to
exploiting shale deposits or the oil sands. 19

14

See, e.g., John M. Smith, The Prodigal Son Returns: Oil and Gas Drillers Return to
Pennsylvania with a Vengeance—Are Municipalities Prepared?, 49 DUQ. L. REV. 1, 4
(2011) (discussing how the explosion of interest in the Marcellus Shale formation has made
several landowners “millionaires overnight”); Steve Hargreaves, Billions of Barrels of
Untapped
U.S.
Oil,
CNN
MONEY
(Mar.
9,
2011,
4:13
PM),
http://money.cnn.com/2011/03/04/news/economy/oil_shale_bakken/index.htm (discussing
ability of resource exploitation to prop up local economies in North Dakota’s Bakken Shale
play); Brooks, supra note 9 (mentioning shale drilling’s impact on an “economically
wounded” western Pennsylvania).
15
See Brooks, supra note 9.
16
Jim Efstathiou, Jr., Shale-Gas Drilling to Add 870,000 Jobs by 2015, Report Says,
BLOOMBERG (Dec. 6, 2011, 2:55 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-12-06/shalegas-drilling-to-add-870-000-u-s-jobs-by-2015-report-says.html (discussing an industrygroup-commissioned report additionally claiming $118 billion in economic growth from
shale gas in the next four years).
17
See Mary Anastasia O’Grady, Opinion, Canada’s Oil Sands are a Jobs Gusher, WALL
ST.
J.
(Sept.
12,
2011,
12:00
AM),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904836104576560933917369412.html.
18
Although now a relatively ubiquitous term for the prognosis of systemic slow growth
in the aftermath of the 2007–2009 credit crisis, the idea of the “new normal” was actually
developed by fund managers Bill Gross and Mohammed El-Erian. See Peter C. Beller &
Michael Maiello, Pimco’s New Normal, FORBES (Jan. 21, 2010, 1:00 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2010/0208/investing-mutual-funds-stocks-pimco-newnormal.html.
19
In order to effect this comparison, this Comment assumes that crude oil and natural
gas production hold equal appeal to those in the energy sector. This may not necessarily be
true in the immediate status quo, as a current glut of American natural gas is driving prices
lower and lower, at least in the short term. See Shale Gas: Boom or Glut?, ECONOMIST
INTELLIGENCE
UNIT
(Jan.
20,
2012,
4:50
PM),
http://eiuviews.com/index.php/energy/2012/01/20/shale-gas-boom-or-glut/. However, this
glut is not stopping investment in shale gas by energy companies, who are taking a more
bullish long-term view with an eye to eventually exporting liquefied natural gas (LNG) to
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In developing its analysis, this Comment focuses on the regulatory
environments of Alberta, Canada (home to most of North America’s oil
sands)20 and Pennsylvania, United States (home to the vast Marcellus Shale
play).21 The first Part of this Comment will provide background
information on these regions, their specific resources, and the impacts of oil
and gas extraction. Part II will discuss current federal and state/provincial
regulatory regimes in Pennsylvania and Alberta. Part III will address
differences between these regulatory regimes and discuss their implications
for developers. Finally, this Comment will conclude that Alberta’s
regulatory regime is more favorable to developers than Pennsylvania’s
regime, and argue that exploitation of the oil sands, at least in the short
term, is preferable for a hypothetical, resource-agnostic developer. 22

countries where gas is in higher demand. Id. Companies have already begun to receive
permission from the U.S. Department of Energy to export LNG, and the United States will
likely be a net-exporter of LNG by 2016. See Katarzyna Klimasinska, U.S. Seen Being a
Liquefied Gas Exporter in 2016 on Fracking Gains, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 23, 2012, 2:28 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-01-23/u-s-seen-being-liquefied-gas-exporter-in2016-on-fracking-gains.html.
20
HUMPHRIES ET AL., supra note 10, at 4.
21
See Susan L. Sakmar, The Global Shale Gas Initiative: Will the United States Be the
Role Model for the Development of Shale Gas Around the World?, 33 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 369,
384 (2011).
22
While Alberta is the locus of oil sands extraction in both Canada and North America,
HUMPHRIES ET AL., supra note 10, at 4, Pennsylvania is not the only location for shale
drilling in the United States. See, e.g., U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY
OUTLOOK 2012 WITH PROJECTIONS TO 2035, at 58 (2012) [hereinafter USEIA 2012 ENERGY
OUTLOOK], available at http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/pdf/0383(2012).pdf (listing the
reserves of selected domestic shale plays). Nevertheless, according to the U.S. Energy
Information Administration’s (EIA) 2012 Annual Energy Outlook report, the Marcellus
Shale contains more than 140 trillion cubic feet of unproved natural gas reserves—the most
of any domestic play listed in the report. Id. More than 60% of these gas reserves are
located in Pennsylvania. Id. at 64. Unproved oil and gas resources are reserves that are
estimated to be technically recoverable given current technology but without consideration
for economics or existing operating conditions. Id. at 56. These reserves become “proved”
when they are expected to be produced, given economics and existing operating conditions.
Id. While the Marcellus Shale may not have the highest proved reserves of gas in the United
States (this honor belongs to the Barnett Shale formation), the EIA recently reported that its
proved reserves at the start of 2010 were 129 times greater than at their level in 2008—the
greatest increase of any principal shale play analyzed by the EIA. U.S. ENERGY INFO.
ADMIN., U.S. CRUDE OIL, NATURAL G AS, AND NATURAL GAS LIQUIDS PROVED RESERVES,
2010, at 11 (2012) [hereinafter USEIA CRUDE REPORT], available at
http://www.eia.gov/naturalgas/crudeoilreserves/pdf/uscrudeoil.pdf.
This increase, along
with the potential for gains in future natural gas extraction in the Marcellus Shale, inform
this Comment’s decision to use Pennsylvania and its regulatory environment for its crossborder comparative analysis.
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II.

BACKGROUND

A. Pennsylvania
Named after a shale-rock outcropping in Marcellus, New York, the
Marcellus Shale is an underground formation of shale located about 6,000
feet below parts of Pennsylvania, New York, West Virginia, and Ohio. 23
Geographically, the formation covers approximately 95,000 square miles—
territory that includes forty-nine of Pennsylvania’s sixty-seven counties.24
Because it covers approximately two-thirds of Pennsylvania, the Marcellus
Shale has typically been associated with the state. 25
In a recent report, the U.S. Energy Information Administration
estimated that the Marcellus Shale contains over 140 trillion cubic feet of
technically recoverable, unproved natural gas. 26 Independent estimates
suggest that there may be even more recoverable gas than this—perhaps as
much as 330 trillion cubic feet.27 Though oil can also be extracted from
shale rock, the Marcellus Shale is not known for oil production.28
Extraction of the Marcellus Shale’s natural gas has only been
economically viable since 2004.29 Development only began after advances
in extraction technology enabled drillers to feasibly break open shale rock
and release its natural gas. 30 Two technological leaps were particularly
useful in this regard.
First, improvements in horizontal drilling technology made natural gas
extraction economically viable. Horizontal drilling is critical to shale gas
extraction for a variety of reasons:
[H]orizontal drilling increases penetration into the reservoirs because
the natural gas exists in horizontal planes. In addition, horizontal
drilling enables the drill to access more fractures. Finally, and most

23

Smith, supra note 14, at 4.
Id.
25
Laura C. Reeder, Note, Creating a Legal Framework for Regulation of Natural Gas
Extraction from the Marcellus Shale Formation, 34 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV.
999, 1000 (2010).
26
USEIA 2012 ENERGY O UTLOOK, supra note 22, at 58. For a definition of “unproved”
resources, see supra note 12.
27
Kevin Begos, Associated Press, Reports: Marcellus Reserves Larger Than Expected,
BIG STORY (Oct. 20, 2012, 3:42 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/reports-marcellusreserves-larger-expected.
28
See, e.g., USEIA 2012 ENERGY O UTLOOK, supra note 22, at 58 (not listing the
Marcellus Shale as an oil-producing shale play); USEIA CRUDE REPORT, supra note 22, at 11
(noting that the bulk of total oil discoveries in 2010 came from shale plays in Texas and
North Dakota, as well as from offshore sites in the Gulf of Mexico).
29
Smith, supra note 14, at 4.
30
Id.
24
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importantly from a land use perspective, horizontal drilling enables
extraction of natural gas from beneath areas, such as cities, where
drilling rigs typically cannot be assembled.31

Second, innovations in the area of hydraulic fracturing, or, as it is more
commonly called, “fracking,” helped make the release of natural gas from
shale rock possible. 32 Fracking generally involves injecting liquid through
a drill at high pressure into shale rock.33 This pressure creates fissures in
the shale, releasing natural gas that can then be pumped to the surface. 34
The specific method of fracking used in the Marcellus Shale—“slick water
fracking”—was imported from Texas, where it was utilized successfully in
the smaller Barnett Shale play.35 In slick water fracking, large amounts of
fresh water, sand, and “either gel or another friction-reducing substance”
are pumped underground.36 These substances combat the low permeability
of the shale by maximizing the length and height of any fractures made. 37
With respect to the non-aqueous components of typical fracking fluid,
industry estimates peg mixtures at 90% water, 9.5% sand, and 0.5%
chemicals.38
Aboveground, there is an extensive infrastructure devoted to fracking.
Fracking operations often contain as many as ten points of underground
extraction.39 These points of extraction, called “well pads,” typically
contain each the following: wells; diesel-powered drill rigs; large, dieselpowered pumps used for injecting fracking fluid underground; trailers for
housing the drilling crew; and “frac” ponds used to hold the fresh water
soon to be injected underground and/or already-used fracking fluid. 40 The
frac ponds are particularly enormous—usually several acres in size. 41
Well pads also connect to structures related to the “midstream” transfer
and processing of natural gas.42 Here, raw material is extracted from the
well pads, stripped of its liquid components, and transformed into the
natural gas that is later sold to “downstream” distributors.43 Midstream
structures connect to pipeline networks that can allow for the inter-state and
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
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Reeder, supra note 25, at 1004.
Smith, supra note 14, at 4.
Sakmar, supra note 21, at 377.
Id.
Reeder, supra note 25, at 1004–05.
Id. at 1005.
Id.
Sakmar, supra note 21, at 378.
Smith, supra note 14, at 7.
Id. at 6.
Id.
Id. at 7–8.
Id.
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even cross-continental transfer of gas produced on a well pad.44
Shale drilling and the natural gas industry have brought a great deal of
economic activity to Pennsylvania. The lure of investment in natural gas
extraction, transfer, and processing has brought both strategic and financial
buyers to the region.45 Foreign companies seeking access to the industry
have also descended on the Marcellus Shale.46 Further, at a more granular
level, shale gas has created thousands of jobs in Pennsylvania. 47 Counties
in which drilling directly occurs saw nonfarm employment grow over 5%
between 2009 and 2011—a level far exceeding the growth rate for the rest
of Pennsylvania. 48 Nearby cities servicing the shale gas industry have seen
strong gains in employment ancillary to the energy sector. 49 Depending on
the price of natural gas in future years, Wells Fargo estimates that
employment in Pennsylvania will increase by between 325,000 and 825,000
jobs by 2020.50
Economic benefits notwithstanding, however, shale drilling is not
without its hazards and its critics. Fracking operations “generate light,
noise, dust, fumes, traffic, and drastic changes to the land, all of which
affect the daily lives of the people living in [local Pennsylvania]

44

De La Merced & Krauss, supra note 1.
See, e.g., Peter Lattman, K.K.R.’s Energy Billionaires Club, DEALBOOK (Nov. 25,
2011, 12:25 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/11/25/k-k-r-s-energy-billionaires-club/
(discussing a specific investment by private equity firm Kohlberg, Kravis & Roberts);
Sakmar, supra note 21, at 404 (discussing Exxon’s 2009 merger with XTO Energy for
purposes of gaining access to well sites and drilling expertise).
46
See, e.g., Erich Schwartzel, Marcellus Shale Development Puts State on Map
Internationally, PITTSBURG POST-G AZETTE (Mar. 20, 2012), http://old.postgazette.com/pg/12080/1218001-334.stm (discussing current or potential future investments
by Norway’s Statoil, Germany’s Bayer Corp., and British Petroleum); Sakmar, supra note
21, at 392 (mentioning a 2010 $1.7 billion investment in the Marcellus Shale by India’s
largest private company, Reliance Industries).
47
Recent studies by various institutions estimate that the shale gas industry created
between 10,000 and 44,000 new jobs in Pennsylvania in 2009. See John L. Micek, Drilling
for Jobs, MORNING CALL (Apr. 14, 2012), http://articles.mcall.com/2012-04-14/news/mc-pamarcellus-jobs-boom-20120414_1_natural-gas-marcellus-shale-gas-pipeline.
48
JAY BRYSON, TIM QUINLAN & JOE SEYDL, WELLS FARGO LLC ECON. GRP., RECENT
PENNSYLVANIA
JOB
TRENDS:
EFFECTS
OF
SHALE?
4
(2012),
https://www.wellsfargo.com/downloads/pdf/com/insights/economics/regionalreports/PennsylvaniaShale_03122012.pdf.
49
In the city of Williamsport, for instance, the energy sector has not only been
responsible for 40% of employment growth since February 2010, but has also likely affected
growth in the City’s leisure and hospitality sector, which has been responsible for 35% of
employment growth during the same period. Id. Pittsburgh has also experienced a similar,
albeit less pronounced, effect. Id. at 5.
50
Id. at 9. While this forecast does not isolate jobs created specifically within the energy
sector, Wells Fargo conducted its study for the purpose of determining the extent to which
the shale gas industry was driving employment growth in Pennsylvania. Id. at 6.
45
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communities.”51 Further, fracking has been associated with significant
environmental and public health concerns. Although a 2011 poll indicated
that approximately two-thirds of Pennsylvanians viewed the economic
benefits of the shale gas industry as outweighing environmental concerns, 52
these concerns have still fueled significant public outcry.53
At the center of this controversy are the chemicals used in the
hydraulic fracturing process. In an extensive report on the environmental
impact of the shale gas industry, public interest news group ProPublica
identified leaking condensate tanks (tanks used to hold liquid hydrocarbons
detached from extracted natural gas) and massive, open-air frac ponds as
possible sources of air and groundwater contamination. 54 ProPublica also
reported that people living close to fracking operations have experienced
respiratory infections, headaches, nausea, rashes, and “[m]ore rarely,”
miscarriages, tumors, cancer, and benzene poisoning.55 Nevertheless,
ProPublica noted that researchers have not been able to “‘draw good solid
conclusions about whether [fracking] is a public health risk as a whole.’”56
Similarly, evidence linking fracking chemicals to livestock deaths across
Pennsylvania is so far anecdotal.57
Whether real or imagined, the threat of contamination has captured the
public’s attention. Celebrities have publicly come out against fracking in
Pennsylvania and other states. 58 The Emmy-award-winning documentary
51

Smith, supra note 14, at 9.
Kris Maher, New Challenges to Gas Drilling, WALL ST. J., Sept. 12, 2011, at A3.
53
See, e.g., James Gerken, Delaware Basin Fracking Decision Delayed, HUFFINGTON
POST (Nov. 23, 2011, 3:41 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/11/23/delaware-riverbasin-fracking-decision_n_1108141.html; Sarah Hoye, “Fracking” Protesters Say Jobs Not
Worth
Environmental
Risks,
CNN.COM
(Sept.
20,
2011,
8:58
AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2011/US/09/20/philadelphia.fracking.protests/index.html?hpt=hp_bn1.
54
Abrahm Lustgarden & Nicholas Kusnetz, Science Lags as Health Problems Near Gas
Fields, PROPUBLICA (Sept. 16, 2011, 5:35 PM), http://www.propublica.org/article/sciencelags-as-health-problems-emerge-near-gas-fields. Open-air frac ponds are a particular issue
for Pennsylvania, unlike other states (such as Texas), since Pennsylvania does not have
limestone-capped subterranean reservoirs that can be used to hold spent fracking fluid.
Reeder, supra note 25, at 1012.
55
Lunstgarden & Kusnetz, supra note 54.
56
Id. (quoting Christopher Portier, Director of the U.S. Agency for Toxic Substances
and Disease Registry and the National Center for Environmental Health). Part of the reason
why there are only anecdotal findings at this stage is because natural gas drilling has only
occurred in Pennsylvania in earnest since 2008. Id.
57
Mike DiPaola, Fracking’s Toll on Pets, Livestock Chills Farmers, BLOOMBERG (Feb.
7, 2012, 11:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-02-08/fracking-s-toll-on-petslivestock-chills-pennsylvania-farmers-commentary.html (“We don’t know what the
chemicals are in a lot of these cases,” says Bamberger. “It gets very frustrating when you
start saying: What was in the tissue? What killed these animals exactly?”).
58
See, e.g., Mireya Navarro, Chants, Boos, and Celebrities at a Hearing on Fracking,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 30, 2011), http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/11/30/chants-boos-and52
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“GasLand” showed residential tap water located close to shale gas
operations catching fire when exposed to an open flame. 59 The state of
New York has even gone so far as to declare a ban on fracking within its
borders.60 Indeed, supporters of the New York state moratorium point to
fracking’s impact on Pennsylvania as evidence for why the ban should stay
in place.61 Ultimately, the public health concern associated with fracking
circumscribes the economic promise of shale drilling in Pennsylvania, and
undoubtedly informs the scope of federal and state regulations.
B. Alberta
In contrast to the United States, where shale plays are located in
multiple states, Canada has oil sands reserves that are almost entirely
located within the province of Alberta. 62 Nevertheless, these reserves are
enormous, underlying an area of boreal forests approximately the size of the
state of Florida, or 149,000 square kilometers. 63 These reserves exist in
three main deposits: Peace River, Cold Lake, and Athabasca, which is the
largest and most developed of the deposits. 64 Per a 2010 estimate, the
Alberta government claims that the oil sands hold approximately 170
billion barrels of proven crude oil reserves. 65 This gives Canada the third
largest oil reserves in the world, behind only Saudi Arabia and Venezuela. 66
Despite its connection to crude oil, the term “oil sand” is something of

celebrities-at-a-standoff-on-fracking/ (mentioning appearances by three actors at a recent
hearing in New York); Kate Sinding, Celebrities Speak Out to Keep New York’s Tap Water
Safe from Fracking, SWITCHBOARD: NATURAL RES. DEF. COUNCIL STAFF BLOG (June 8,
2011),
http://switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/ksinding/new_video_celebrities_speak_ou.html
(mentioning a new online video about fracking and water quality launched by the Natural
Resources Defense Council, which features several famous actors); Gerken, supra note 53
(mentioning appearances by Josh Fox, the director of “GasLand,” and actor Mark Ruffalo at
a recent anti-shale rally).
59
Hoye, supra note 53.
60
Inae Oh, New York Fracking Protest Urges Cuomo to Ban Controversial Drilling,
HUFFINGTON
POST
(Aug.
22,
2012,
5:08
PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/22/new-york-fracking-protest-cuomophotos_n_1822575.html.
61
See id.; Mary Esch, Associated Press, For NY Farmers, Fracking Means Salvation _
or Ruin, BIG STORY (May 20, 2012, 1:25 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/content/ny-farmersfracking-means-salvation-or-ruin.
62
WOYNILLOWICZ ET AL., supra note 7, at 1.
63
Id.
64
Facts and Statistics, ALTA. ENERGY, http://www.energy.alberta.ca/oilsands/791.asp
(last visited Oct. 30, 2012).
65
WOYNILLOWICZ ET AL., supra note 7, at 11.
66
Country Comparison: Oil—Proved Reserves, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2178rank.html (last
visited Feb. 7, 2012).
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a misnomer; oil sands are neither really oil, in the conventional sense, nor
sand. Rather, oil sands deposits are combinations of sand, water, clay, silt,
and crude bitumen. 67 Crude bitumen is the material relevant to the
production of the synthetic crude oil used in automobiles and other
industrial contexts. 68
The history of oil sands development in Alberta began in 1944, when
the government of Alberta entered into a joint venture with a private
company to build a pilot plant near the city of Fort McMurray. 69
Commercial production began in the late-1960s, and remained relatively
low through the mid-1990s, although the cost of bitumen extraction fell
during this period as well. 70
Starting in the mid-1990s, however, the Alberta government
consciously tried to make the oil sands an economically viable resource,
convening a task force of oil industry representatives and government
officials to study the issue.71 The government eventually implemented
many of the task force’s recommendations. 72 One of the implemented
recommendations was a public relations campaign aimed at raising the
profile of the oil sands both in Canada and abroad.73 Here, Alberta
attempted to improve the public perception of its oil reserves by declaring
the sands a “national prize,” and by adopting the name “oil sands” instead
of the previously used, dirtier sounding “tar sands.”74
Also implemented were the task force’s economic recommendations,
aimed at incentivizing development. In 1997, Alberta’s provincial
government established a generous royalty regime for oil sands developers;
the government’s Generic Oil Sands Regime promised to collect only 1% of
a developer’s total revenue until the developer had recovered all of its
capital expenses, after which Alberta would collect 25% of the total
revenue.75 In addition to encouraging initial investments in oil sands
extraction, this structure also promoted rapid reinvestment and growth.76
Economic incentives also manifested themselves at the federal level
through tax policy. Through tax deductions, for instance, the federal
government allowed accelerated cost recovery of expenses relating to oil

67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
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sands extraction, including the cost of oil sands leases and strip mining.77
Similar to the effect of Alberta’s royalty regime, Canada’s accelerated cost
recovery provision was aimed at incentivizing developers to continue
spending on oil sands projects. 78
By the mid-2000s, many foreign oil companies had begun moving into
the oil sands.79 Exposure to the resource increased in the American energy
community, spurring heavy demand. 80 As of 2011, output from the oil
sands was pegged at 1.6 million barrels of crude oil per day, with
production figures expected to more than double by 2025.81
The depth of any particular deposit determines the method by which
oil sands are extracted and crude bitumen is removed. 82 Strip mining is
typically used to access shallower deposits, usually less than 100 meters
from the surface.83 Here, the overburden—trees, soil, and rock irrelevant to
mining—is cleared, leaving underlying bituminous ore exposed for
removal.84 The extracted oil sands are subsequently mixed with hot water
and chemically treated to separate the bitumen from the rest of the mixture,
referred to as “tailings.”85
More common than strip mining is in-situ recovery, which is more
appropriate for extracting bitumen at greater depths.86 Generally, with insitu extraction, steam is pumped underground to the oil sands, where it
separates bitumen from the rest of the oil sands by reducing the bitumen’s

77
See Nathan Vanderklippe & Carrie Tait, Oil Sands Tax Incentives Targeted, GLOBE &
MAIL
(Mar.
22,
2011,
7:05
PM),
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/budget/business/oil-sands-tax-incentivestargeted/article1952194/page1/.
78
See id.
79
See, e.g., Sonja Franklin & Eduard Gismatullin, BP, Husky Energy Agree to Form OilSands Partnerships (Update6), BLOOMBERG (Dec. 5, 2007, 4:25 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a18oTMnaz4zQ&refer=cana
da; In-Soo Nam, KNOC, Other South Korean Cos to Jointly Develop Canada Oil Sands,
DOW
JONES
NEWSWIRE
(Mar.
16,
2007),
http://www.rigzone.com/news/article.asp?a_id=42657 (discussing a 2006 investment by
KNOC); Synenco & Sinopec Enter Deal for Canadian Oil Sands Project, RIGZONE (May 31,
2005), http://www.rigzone.com/news/article.asp?a_id=22835.
80
WOYNILLOWICZ ET AL., supra note 7, at 4.
81
Press Release, Can. Ass’n of Petroleum Producers, Conventional Production, Oil
Sands Projects Underpin Strong Crude Oil Forecast (June 5, 2012),
http://www.capp.ca/aboutUs/mediaCentre/NewsReleases/Pages/2012-oil-forecast.aspx.
82
See Jason Metcalf, Waste in the Land of Plenty: An Examination of the Theoretical
Implications of Waste on the Alberta Oil Sands Deposit, 45 ALTA. L. REV. 227, 228 (2007).
83
WOYNILLOWICZ ET AL., supra note 7, at 11.
84
Metcalf, supra note 82.
85
Id.
86
Id.
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viscosity.87 The bitumen is then pumped upwards.88 In the most common
form of in-situ extraction,89 between four and ten pairs of wells extract
bitumen at the same time. 90
As with shale drilling, oil sands infrastructure does not end with
extraction. Crude bitumen still must be upgraded to commercially viable,
synthetic crude oil. 91 Upgrading proceeds in two steps: first, either coking
or hydrocracking for fracturing large bitumen hydrocarbons into smaller
pieces, and second, hydrotreating to remove nitrogen and sulfur from the
finished product.92
Regardless of the specific method employed, the upgrading of oil
sands bitumen into synthetic crude oil is inefficient and resource intensive.
All told, two tons of oil sands must be extracted and processed to produce
one barrel of synthetic crude oil. 93 Further, the bitumen extraction and
upgrading process requires energy itself—usually in the form of natural
gas.94 Though natural gas is relatively clean burning, it was estimated in
2005 that the oil sands sector in Alberta consumed 0.6 billion cubic feet of
gas per day.95
The energy intensiveness of the oil sands industry is a point of
environmental concern. Though the industry has made significant strides in
becoming more energy efficient in recent years, “the rapid rate of new
development has more than consumed these gains.”96 Currently “[o]ilsands crude results in emissions from production and consumption in
vehicles that are about [twenty] percent higher than the average emissions
of conventional oil production in the U.S.”97 These emissions contribute to

87

Id. at 229.
There are two common methods of in-situ mining: Cyclic Steam Stimulation (CSS)
and Steam Assisted Gravity Drainage (SAGD). Id. For CSS, a single well may be used to
both heat the oil sands and pump up the separated bitumen. Id. For SAGD, two horizontally
drilled wells are used, with steam constantly injected in one, and bitumen constantly
recovered in the other. Id.
89
SAGD is the most common form of in-situ extraction. WOYNILLOWICZ ET AL., supra
note 7, at 12.
90
Id. at 13.
91
Id. at 14.
92
Id.
93
Id. at 11–12. Further adding to the resource intensiveness of oil sands drilling, one
barrel of synthetic crude only fills three-fourths of the gas tank of a common pickup truck.
Id. at 14.
94
Id. at 15.
95
WOYNILLOWICZ ET AL., supra note 7, at 15.
96
Id. at 19.
97
Jeremy van Loon, Oil-Sands CO2 to Match Conventional in a Decade, Suncor CEO
Says, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 5, 2011, 8:10 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-1006/oil-sands-co2-to-match-conventional-in-decade-suncor-ceo-says.html.
88
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Canada’s overall greenhouse gas output, which is already well above the
levels that the country pledged to maintain when it ratified the Kyoto
Protocol (Kyoto) in 2002.98 While the oil sands industry alone is not to
blame, Alberta produces one-third of all of Canada’s greenhouse gas
emissions while only having 10% of the country’s population.99
The oil sands industry has also been linked to other environmental
issues. Deforestation is implicated, for instance, as Alberta’s oil sands
deposits are located below boreal forests that must be leveled in order to
allow for strip mining and in-situ recovery. 100 Water pollution is also a
concern. Here, the primary culprits are tailings ponds, which hold the
slurry of water, fine clay, and silt left over from the bitumen-extraction
process.101 Some leftover bitumen also remains in this mixture, and in its
post-treatment form this bitumen is toxic to aquatic life and migratory
birds.102 Like frac ponds in the shale context, tailings ponds are very large,
collectively covering more than fifty square kilometers in Canada as of
2005.103
There is some degree of concern within the scientific community that
contamination from tailings ponds will eventually be toxic to humans.104
However, at least in the status quo, there appears to be little evidence of
such direct harm.105
Rather, the incremental environmental harms
stemming from Alberta’s oil sands industry can best be described as “death
by a thousand cuts.”106
In any event, environmental concerns have not stopped the oil sands
industry from becoming successful enough for many to believe that
government incentives are no longer needed. 107 Today, there is a great deal

98
See Stepan Wood et al., Whatever Happened to Canadian Environmental Law?, 37
ECOLOGY L.Q. 981, 1008–09 (2010) (discussing how far off Canada is from being able to
reduce its greenhouse gas emissions to 6% below their 1990 levels, as it promised under
Kyoto).
99
Teresa Meadows & Tony Crossman, A Tale of Two Provinces: Imposing Greenhouse
Gas Emissions Constraints Through Law and Policy in Alberta and British Columbia, 47
ALTA. L. REV. 421, 426 (2010).
100
WOYNILLOWICZ ET AL., supra note 7, at 36–37.
101
Id. at 30–31.
102
Id. at 31.
103
Id. at 30.
104
See David Biello, Oil-Sands Raise Levels of Cancer-Causing Compounds in Regional
Waters, SCI. AM. (Jan. 8, 2013), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=oilsands-raise-levels-of-carcinogens-in-regional-waters.
105
The Pembina Institute, a respected research organization and authority on the oil
sands, does not list any direct harm to humans in its 2005 report. See generally id. at 19–25,
27–52 (noting broader environmental impacts).
106
Id. at 27.
107
See, e.g., WOYNILLOWICZ ET AL., supra note 7, at 59 (arguing that the initial economic
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of foreign and domestic merger activity in the oil sands sector. 108 While
during the 1970s only two Canadian energy companies operated in the oil
sands,109 today more than 900 firms from the United States alone play some
role in Alberta’s energy sector.110
Alberta’s residents have been the beneficiaries of this rapid growth.
As of 2011, the province’s oil and gas sector directly employed about
271,000 people, while also supporting “hundreds of thousands of indirect
jobs in sectors such as construction, manufacturing[,] and financial
services.”111 This employment boost kept Alberta’s unemployment rate for
that same year at 5.6%–1.7% lower than Canada’s overall unemployment
rate.112 Indeed, the oil sands have arguably helped Canada’s national
economy rebound from the 2007–2009 financial crisis, as the country’s
focus on energy in part spurred a growth rate higher than that of the United
States in 2010 and 2011.113
Ultimately, both the Prime Minister of Canada114 and Alison Redford,
elected premier of Alberta in late 2011, have declared their support for
continued oil sands development.115 This support no doubt informs the

subsidies provided at the provincial and state levels “are still in place today although the
industry has attained an undeniable level of economic sustainability”); Vanderklippe & Tait,
supra note 77 (“[T]he [federal] government is of the view that with oil prices where they are,
the industry is quite healthy. And it would appear to be their view that corporations don’t
need the same rapid writeoffs they’ve had in the past . . . .”).
108
See, e.g., Michael J. De La Merced, Sinopec to Buy Daylight Energy for $2.1 Billion,
DEALBOOK (Oct. 9, 2011, 6:16 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/10/09/sinopec-tobuy-daylight-energy-for-2-1-billion/; Chris V. Nicholson, Cnooc to Pay $2.1 Billion for
Canadian
Oil
Sands
Firm,
DEALBOOK (July 20,
2011,
7:57
AM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/07/20/cnooc-to-pay-2-1-billion-for-canadian-oil-sandsfirm/; Jeremy van Loon, Canada Shifts Toward China with $15 Billion Nexen Deal,
BLOOMBERG (July 24, 2012, 12:08 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-0723/canada-shifts-toward-china-with-15-billion-nexen-bid.html.
109
WOYNILLOWICZ ET AL., supra note 7, at 2; Oil Sands History, SYNCRUDE CAN. LTD.,
http://www.syncrude.ca/users/folder.asp?FolderID=5657 (last visited Jan. 4, 2013).
110
O’Grady, supra note 17.
111
Id.
112
Id.
113
See id. (discussing growth rates for the two countries in 2010 and an International
Monetary Fund growth rate projection for 2011 that put Canada ahead once more).
114
See Egan, supra note 13.
115
See, e.g., Chris Selley, Alison Redford Brings Conciliatory Oil Sands Pitch to Ontario,
NAT’L
POST
(Nov.
16,
2011,
7:20
PM)
(Can.),
http://fullcomment.nationalpost.com/2011/11/16/chris-selley-alison-redford-bringsconciliatory-oil-sands-pitch-to-ontario/ (discussing Redford giving thanks to the province of
Ontario for investing in the oil sands, and coming close to “kiboshing any future carbon
capture and storage projects” while speaking to reporters); Dawn Walton, Western Premiers
Push Plan to Showcase Canada as “Energy Powerhouse,” GLOBE & MAIL
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/western-premiers-push-plan-to-showcase-
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restrictiveness of regulations that implicate the Canadian oil sands sector.
III. CURRENT REGULATORY REGIMES IN PENNSYLVANIA AND
ALBERTA
Overall, the regulatory regimes governing the extraction of natural gas
in Pennsylvania and oil in Alberta reflect a concern over the negative health
and environmental impacts of each industry on its respective region. These
regimes each also consist of a mix of federal, state/provincial, and even substate/provincial laws. These laws will be discussed in greater depth below.
A. Pennsylvania
1. Federal Laws
When it comes to regulating the oil and gas industry, the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is the central actor at the federal
level. The EPA’s enforcement of the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA)
has the potential to significantly constrain the extraction of shale gas in
Pennsylvania.116 The EPA also conducts research on the environmental
harms associated with fracking that has the potential to inform its future
regulatory position. These issues will be discussed below.

canada-as-energy-powerhouse/article2269984/ (last updated Sept. 6, 2012, 11:02 AM)
(discussing Redford’s leadership of a coalition consisting of herself and the premiers of
Saskatchewan and British Columbia for the purpose of lobbying the federal government to
develop a national strategy around showcasing the Canadian energy sector).
116
The EPA also enforces another law that impacts the shale gas industry in
Pennsylvania—the Clean Water Act (CWA). MARY TIEMANN ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., R42333, MARCELLUS SHALE G AS: DEVELOPMENT POTENTIAL AND WATER
MANAGEMENT
ISSUES
AND
LAWS
2
(2012),
available
at
http://www.arcticgas.gov/sites/default/files/documents/12-1-27-crs-marcellus-shale-gasdevelopment-potential-issues-laws.pdf. However, as it applies to this industry, the CWA
appears primarily directed towards regulating the discharge of now-potable wastewater (like
spent fracking fluid) into streams and rivers. Id. at 20; see also Regulation of Hydraulic
Fracturing Under the Safe Water Drinking Act, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
http://water.epa.gov/type/groundwater/uic/class2/hydraulicfracturing/wells_hydroreg.cfm
(last visited Nov. 26, 2011) [hereinafter Regulation of Hydraulic Fracturing]. The facilities
that process, clean, and then discharge spent fracking fluid are publicly owned treatment
works or private waste treatment facilities that are usually neither owned nor otherwise
affiliated with the drillers themselves. TIEMANN ET AL., supra note 116, at 19. These
facilities are often ill-equipped to properly process spent fracking fluid, but that is typically a
non-issue, as many major drillers intend to recycle and re-use at least 90% of the flowback
from their fracking operations. Id. at 22 (discussing the practices of six drillers that, when
combined, hold more than half of all natural gas drilling permits in the state of
Pennsylvania). Thus, the CWA does not appear to be a major hurdle for this Comment’s
hypothetical fossil fuel developer.
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i. Safe Drinking Water Act
Through the power granted to it under section 1421 of the SDWA, the
EPA can regulate the underground injection of fluid for the purpose of
protecting drinking water. 117 The ability to create specific regulations for
underground injection lies in the hands of either individual states or the
EPA itself.118 In Pennsylvania, the EPA has retained primacy in crafting
regulations for wells associated with oil and gas production. 119 The EPA’s
minimum permitting standards require drillers to, among other things,
submit annual reports, pressure-test infrastructure to maintain well integrity,
space wells at least one-fourth of a mile apart, and monitor flow rate and
cumulative pressure of underground injection.120 Rule violators face both
civil and criminal penalties, with the maximum civil penalty in some cases
being as high as $25,000 per day.121 Finally, individual citizens also have
the right to launch civil suits against rule violators (and indeed, even the
EPA itself, for a failure to enforce its own rules) under the SDWA. 122
Those in the business of extracting unconventional fossil fuels,
however, currently have little to fear from SDWA’s penalties. Amended by
the Energy Policy Act of 2005, section 1421 of the SDWA now mandates
that the definition of “underground injection” exclude fluids used in the
fracking process other than diesel fuels. 123 Thus, fracking as it pertains to
shale gas is essentially exempted from the SDWA.124

117
42 U.S.C. § 300h (2011) (“Regulations of the Administrator under this section for
State underground injection control programs may not prescribe requirements which
interfere with or impede (A) the underground injection of brine or other fluids which are
brought to the surface in connection with oil or natural gas production or natural gas storage
operations, or (B) any underground injection for the secondary or tertiary recovery of oil or
natural gas, unless such requirements are essential to assure that underground sources of
drinking water will not be endangered by such injection.”) (emphasis added); see also
Regulation of Hydraulic Fracturing, supra note 116.
118
42 U.S.C. § 300h-1.
119
TIEMANN ET AL., supra note 115, at 28.
120
MARY TIEMANN & ADAM VANN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41760, HYDRAULIC
FRACTURING AND SAFE DRINKING WATER ACT ISSUES 12 (2012), available at
www.nationalaglawcenter.org/assets/crs/R41760.pdf.
121
42 U.S.C. § 300h-2.
122
Id. § 300j-8.
123
Energy Policy Act of 2005, H.R. 6, 109th Cong. § 322 (2005).
124
The SDWA’s position on fracking appears to be an about-face from the U.S.
government’s stance from nearly a decade earlier, when the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit held that fracking in coal beds for the purposes of extracting methane gas
did constitute an activity regulated under the SDWA. See Legal Envtl. Assistance Found. v.
EPA, 118 F.3d 1467, 1469 (11th Cir. 1997). In Legal Envtl. Assistance Found., the court
held that coal-bed fracking was not exempt from the Underground Injection Control (UIC)
program established by the EPA pursuant to the SDWA and implemented by the state of
Alabama. Id.; see also Sakmar, supra note 21, at 409. Unlike Pennsylvania, Alabama has
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The Energy Policy Act of 2005 was no doubt influenced by an EPA
report on fracking published a year earlier.125 In this report, the EPA
analyzed peer-reviewed articles and surveyed numerous government
employees and concerned citizens126 before concluding that it could find no
evidence that fracking in coal beds (for the purpose of releasing and
collecting methane gas) contaminated nearby sources of drinking water. 127
The finding was “roundly criticized” for not completely studying the issue,
and for being politically motivated and reviewed by those with conflicts of
interest.128
More recently, the EPA has begun revisiting the issue of fracking. In
response to the growth of fracking in the natural gas sector, the U.S. House
of Representatives in 2010 issued a directive to the EPA urging another
study on fracking and its impact on drinking water. 129 The EPA is currently
in the process of conducting this study, with a report on interim results due
in 2012.130 The EPA expects to release a final draft report for public
comment and peer review in 2014.131
In any case, interim EPA actions have not displayed a reformed
attitude toward fracking. For instance, in 2011, after it found a link
between contaminated groundwater and fracking in Wyoming, the EPA
agreed to delay public announcement of this finding at the behest of the
state’s government.132 This gave opponents of the study time to “coordinate
been granted primacy to enforce the SDWA by the EPA. See Sakmar, supra note 21, at 408.
125
See generally U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EVALUATION OF IMPACTS TO
UNDERGROUND SOURCES OF DRINKING WATER BY HYDRAULIC FRACTURING OF COALBED
METHANE
RESERVOIRS
(2004),
available
at
http://water.epa.gov/type/groundwater/uic/class2/hydraulicfracturing/wells_coalbedmethanes
tudy.cfm.
126
See id. at 2-3 to 2-5 (“EPA researched more than 200 peer-reviewed publications,
interviewed approximately 50 employees from industry and state or local government
agencies, and communicated with approximately 40 citizens and groups who [were]
concerned that CBM production affected their drinking water wells.”).
127
Lynn Kerr McKay et al., Science and the Reasonable Development of Marcellus Shale
Natural Gas Resources in Pennsylvania and New York, 32 ENERGY L.J. 125, 135 (2011)
(internal citation omitted).
128
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
129
See Memorandum from Fred S. Hauchman, Dir., Office of Sci. Policy to Edward
Hanlon, Designated Fed. Officer, EPA Sci. Advisory Bd. Staff, Request for Review of the
Draft Plan to Study the Potential Impacts of Hydraulic on Drinking Water Sources (Feb. 7,
2011), http://www.epa.gov/hfstudy/SAB-Revew-Request-Final-2-8-11.pdf.
130
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, DRAFT PLAN TO STUDY THE POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF
HYDRAULIC FRACTURING ON DRINKING WATER SOURCES viii (2011), available at
http://www.shalegas.energy.gov/resources/HFStudyPlanDraft_SAB_020711.pdf.
131
Id.
132
See Mead Gruver, EPA Fracking Study Announcement Was Delayed by Wyoming
Officials,
HUFFINGTON
POST
(May
3,
2012,
7:35
PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/05/03/epa-fracking-study-wyoming-
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[an] all-out press” against its findings,133 which the EPA subsequently
agreed to subject to a retest. 134 Interestingly enough, the EPA also recently
found drinking water in Pennsylvania that it had formerly considered
contaminated, now safe.135 Thus, the final result of Congress’ 2010
directive to the EPA remains to be seen.
ii. Fracturing Responsibility and Awareness of Chemicals Act
Congress has also attempted to act itself for the purpose of regulating
the shale gas industry. In 2009, Representative Diana DeGette of Colorado
and Senator Robert (Bob) Casey of Pennsylvania introduced the Fracturing
Responsibility and Awareness of Chemicals Act (FRAC Act) in the House
of Representatives136 and Senate, respectively.137 The FRAC Act was
aimed at revising the SDWA to expressly include fracking fluids in its
purview and require natural gas drilling companies to disclose the types of
chemicals (but not propriety formulas) used in their fracking fluids. 138
Ultimately, however, the Act failed to reach the floor of the House before

delayed_n_1475270.html.
133
See id.; Mead Gruver, EPA Fracking Report on Wyoming Water Doesn’t End Debate,
HUFFINGTON
POST
(Dec.
9,
2011,
4:20
AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/12/09/epa-fracking-report-wyomingwater_n_1138482.html (“Sen. James Inhofe called the study ‘not based on sound science but
rather on political science. Its findings are premature, given that the Agency has not gone
through the necessary peer-review process, and there are still serious outstanding questions
regarding EPA’s data and methodology,’ the Oklahoma Republican said.”).
134
Daniel Gilbert & Russell Gold, EPA Backpedals on Fracking Contamination, WALL
ST.
J.
(Apr.
1,
2012,
1:47
PM),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303404704577313741463447670.html.
Nevertheless, the EPA’s subsequent retest again established a link between fracking and the
contaminated groundwater. See Mark Drajem, Wyoming Water Tests in Line with EPA
Finding
on
Fracking,
BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK
(Oct.
11,
2012),
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-10-10/epa-says-test-of-wyoming-waterconsistent-with-prior-results.
135
Gilbert & Gold, supra note 134.
136
See generally Fracturing Responsibility and Awareness of Chemicals Act of 2009,
H.R. 2766, 111th Cong. (2009).
137
See generally Fracturing Responsibility and Awareness of Chemicals (FRAC) Act, S.
1215, 111th Cong. (2009). Both the Senate and House proposals have been collectively
dubbed the “FRAC Act” by the media. See, e.g., Abrahm Lustgarten, FRAC Act—Congress
Introduces Twin Bills to Control Drilling and Protect Drinking Water, PROPUBLICA (June 9,
2009, 11:31 AM), http://www.propublica.org/article/frac-act-congress-introduces-bills-tocontrol-drilling-609.
138
H.R. 2766 § 2; S. 1215 § 2. Although the language of the Senate bill goes beyond its
House counterpart by seeking to define “underground injection” as the “subsurface
emplacement of fluids by well injection” S. 1215 § 2, both bills have the same general
purpose with respect to amending section 1421 of the SDWA. H.R. 2766 § 2; S. 1215 § 2.
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the 111th Congress recessed.139 The 2010 mid-term election was credited
with killing the Bill.140 Senator Casey and Representative DeGette have
reintroduced the FRAC Act in the Senate and House during the 112th
Congress,141 but the Bill has not yet passed through the initial steps of the
legislative process.142
2. State/Local Laws
A number of actors outside the federal government share in the
regulation of Pennsylvania’s share of the Marcellus Shale: the State of
Pennsylvania, local Pennsylvania municipalities, and the Delaware River
Basin Commission (DRBC), an entity that has jurisdiction in multiple
states. These actors often have differing views on the benefits and
drawbacks of shale drilling. Some degree of regulatory uncertainty has
been the result.
i. Pennsylvania Oil and Gas Act
Enacted in 1984 and most recently amended in 2012,143 the
Pennsylvania Oil and Gas Act (Oil and Gas Act) is the linchpin to the
State’s regulation of the shale gas industry. 144 The Act gives the
139

See Sakmar, supra note 21, at 410–11.
Joshua B. Pribanic, EPA Finds Way to Regulate Hydraulic Fracturing, PUB. HERALD
(Apr. 27, 2011), http://www.publicherald.org/archives/11388/investigative-reports/energyinvestigations/.
141
See Laura Legere, Casey Reintroduces Natural Gas Bills, SCRANTON TIMES-TRIBUNE
(Mar. 16, 2011), http://thetimes-tribune.com/news/gas-drilling/casey-reintroduces-naturalgas-bills-1.1119578#axzz1GmGpdvBy; Benjamin Haas et al., Fracking Hazards Obscured
in Failure to Disclose Wells, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 14, 2012, 5:26 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-08-14/fracking-hazards-obscured-in-failure-todisclose-wells.html.
142
See FRAC Act, S. 587, 112th Cong. (2011); Fracturing Responsibility and Awareness
of Chemicals Act of 2011, H.R. 1084, 112th Cong. (2011). The initial steps of the
legislative process include committee-based deliberation, investigation, and revision of the
bill.
See
The
Legislative
Process,
U.S.
HOUSE
REPRESENTATIVES,
http://www.house.gov/content/learn/legislative_process/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2013).
143
58 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3201 (2012). The recent amendments to the Oil and Gas Act
will be discussed at length in this Part.
144
This is not to say, however, that the Oil and Gas Act is the only hurdle for shale
developers at the state-law level. The Pennsylvania Hazardous Sites Cleanup Act (HSCA)
may also be an option for opponents of fracking. Hazardous Sites Cleanup Act (HSCA),
1988 Pa. Laws 756. In ongoing litigation under the HSCA, for instance, landowners have
alleged that Cabot Oil and Gas Corporation “improperly conducted hydrofracturing and
other natural gas production activities that allowed the release of methane, natural gas, and
other toxins onto [the plaintiffs’] land and into their groundwater.” Fiorentino v. Cabot Oil
& Gas, 750 F. Supp. 2d 506, 509 (M.D. Pa. 2010). The plaintiffs have so far survived the
defendant’s motion to dismiss. Id. In denying that motion, the court found that the plaintiffs
had brought an actionable claim under section 1115 of the HSCA, which provides that “[a]
140
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Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) the authority
to regulate several areas critical to shale drilling, from permitting
requirements145 and well location restrictions146 to bonding issues147 and
eventual well plugging. 148 The DEP also has the authority to inspect well
sites for the purpose of responding to complaints about water quality and
contamination.149 The Act institutes both civil and criminal penalties for
rule violations.150 The DEP, however, appears to rely only on fines.151
From January 1, 2012 through October 29, 2012, the DEP inspected 326
unique unconventional wells, found 628 rule violations, and issued fines for
fewer than thirty of these violations.152
Importantly, the Oil and Gas Act claims to supersede any local
ordinances that “impose conditions, requirements or limitations on the same
features of oil and gas operations regulated by [the Act].”153 This provision

person who has experienced or is threatened with personal injury or property damage as a
result of a release of a hazardous substance may file a civil action against any person to
prevent or abate a violation of this act or of any order, regulation, standard or approval listed
under this act.” HSCA § 1115, 1988 Pa. Laws 815.. Nevertheless, the court has yet to rule
on the merits of this case, leaving the HSCA largely unproven as a regulatory weapon. This
Comment views the Oil and Gas Act as much more of a threat to drillers—enough by itself
to give any prospective investor pause.
145
58 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3211 (2012).
146
Id. § 3215.
147
Id. § 3225.
148
Id. § 3220.
149
Id. § 3218.
150
Id. §§ 3255–3256.
151
For example, the Oil and Gas Compliance Report, available on the DEP’s website,
shows fines as a possible outcome from an inspection, but makes no mention of criminal
penalties. DEP Office of Oil and Gas Management Compliance Report, PA. DEPT. ENVTL.
PROT.,
http://www.depreportingservices.state.pa.us/ReportServer/Pages/ReportViewer.aspx?/Oil_G
as/OG_Compliance (last visited Oct. 29, 2012). Additionally, running this report for all
compliance violations in unconventional wells from January 1, 2012, to October 29, 2012,
yields only fines for violations, and no criminal penalties. Id. (inputting January 1, 2012,
and October 29, 2012, as start and end dates for the report, selecting unconventional wells
only, selecting inspections with violations only, and running the report).
152
Id. The largest fine levied by the DEP during this period was $12,500, for overdue
drilling records. Id. As recently as 2011, however, the DEP levied a fine of over $1 million
to a driller. See Press Release, Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., DEP Fines Chesapeake Energy
More
than
$1
Million
(May
17,
2011),
http://www.portal.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/community/newsroom/14287?id=17405&typei
d=1. Here the DEP fined driller Chesapeake Energy for contaminating private water
supplies near one of its well pads and experiencing a tank fire at another. Id.
153
58 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3302 (2012) (“Except with respect to local ordinances adopted
pursuant to the MPC and the . . . Flood Plain Management Act, all local ordinances
purporting to regulate oil and gas operations regulated by Chapter 32 (relating to
development) are hereby superseded. No local ordinance adopted pursuant to the MPC or
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prevents municipal ordinances from accomplishing the same purposes of
the Act.154 However, it also suggests that municipal ordinances can address
facets of the shale drilling industry not addressed by the Oil and Gas Act.
This duality in the Oil and Gas Act’s supersession clause has been a
source of controversy and litigation in Pennsylvania. The Act, for example,
does not cover “[p]ractical issues such as noise, fencing, security, traffic,
and dust.”155 Nor does it address the ability of municipalities to use zoning
restrictions to limit shale gas extraction within their borders.156 These gaps
in the Oil and Gas Act have been filled by local ordinances.157 These local
rules not only have had the effect of limiting shale industry development in
specific municipalities, but they also have the potential, collectively, to
complicate the shale gas extraction process to the point that the Marcellus
Shale becomes less attractive to energy companies relative to other
domestic shale plays. 158

the Flood Plain Management Act shall contain provisions which impose conditions,
requirements or limitations on the same features of oil and gas operations regulated by
Chapter 32 or that accomplish the same purposes as set forth in Chapter 32. The
Commonwealth, by this section, preempts and supersedes the regulation of oil and gas
operations as provided in this chapter.”). This language is functionally identical to the
language of the Oil and Gas Act’s supersession provision prior to the Act’s amendment in
2012. See S. 402, 1984 Reg. Sess. § 602 (as passed by Pa. Senate and House, Nov. 28, 1984)
(repealed 2012) (“Except with respect to ordinances adopted pursuant to . . . the
Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code, and . . . the Flood Plain Management Act, all
local ordinances and enactments purporting to regulate oil and gas well operations regulated
by this act are hereby superseded. No ordinances or enactments adopted pursuant to the
aforementioned acts shall contain provisions which impose conditions, requirements or
limitations on the same features of oil and gas well operations regulated by this act or that
accomplish the same purposes as set forth in this act. The Commonwealth, by this
enactment, hereby preempts and supersedes the regulation of oil and gas wells as herein
defined.”). The litigation over the Oil and Gas Act’s supersession provision discussed in this
Part is based on the Act’s pre-2012 language.
154
See 58 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3302 (2012).
155
Smith, supra note 14, at 13.
156
See Alerts and Updates: Wiggle Room for Marcellus Gas Drilling, or Potentially
Reversible
Error?,
DUANE
MORRIS
LLP
(Aug.
10,
2010),
http://www.duanemorris.com/alerts/local_regulation_marcellus_shale_drilling_3771.html.
157
See Erich Schwartzel, Marcellus Shale Driller Fighting South Fayette Ordinance,
PITTSBURG POST-GAZETTE (Mar.
30,
2012,
3:43
AM),
http://www.postgazette.com/pg/11229/1167781-503.stm?cmpid=business.xml
(“Throughout
Western
Pennsylvania, townships have passed ordinances that further regulate drilling beyond state
law or take steps to mitigate side effects like road damage or noise control.”); Maher, supra
note 52 (“In the past 18 months, more than 100 Pennsylvania municipalities have enacted
ordinances to limit or regulate such drilling. Local officials say such restrictions fall within a
town’s right to enforce zoning, much in the same way municipalities can prevent a chemical
plant or prison from being built in the middle of a residential neighborhood.”); Smith, supra
note 14, at 13.
158
See Maher, supra note 52 (“‘We want something that’s fair and reasonable,’ said John
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Currently, the ability of municipalities to regulate shale industry
development is supported by Pennsylvania courts.
In 2009, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held, in Huntley & Huntley v. Council of
Oakmont, that a local zoning ordinance preventing a gas driller from
operating in a residential area was not preempted by the Oil and Gas Act.159
Here, the court found that preemption only covered local laws similar to the
Oil and Gas Act with respect to the “technical aspects of well functioning
and matters ancillary thereto (such as registration, bonding, and well site
restoration), rather than the well’s location.”160 The Oil and Gas Act could
not be used to preempt a local law seeking “only to control the location of
wells consistent with established zoning principles.”161
The Pennsylvania government’s response to such Oil and Gas Act
litigation has been relatively swift. In late 2011, both branches of the
Pennsylvania legislature adopted bills seeking to update the Oil and Gas
Act.162 These bills eventually became Act 13, which was signed into law in
early 2012.163 Act 13 seeks revenue from energy companies in the form of
impact fees for individual wells164 and, importantly, has the effect of
restricting the ability of municipalities to implement zoning ordinances

Pinkerton, CEO of Fort Worth-based Range Resources Corp. He said developing the
Marcellus is proving more complicated than other shale plays in part because of the greater
number of municipalities in a state like Pennsylvania. ‘It’s like having to have a different
drivers (sic) license in every township. You just can’t run a business that way.’”).
159
964 A.2d 855 (Pa. 2009); Smith, supra note 14, at 13–15.
160
Huntley & Huntley v. Council of Oakmont, 964 A.2d 855, 864 (Pa. 2009).
161
Smith, supra note 14, at 17. This is to be compared with Range ResourcesAppalachia, L.L.C. v. Salem Twp., where a local ordinance establishing a permit fee for oil
and gas drilling was struck down under Oil and Gas Act preemption for impermissibly
encroaching on the Act’s purposes, “broadly speaking,” of “optimizing oil and gas
development, ensuring the safety of the personnel and facilities used in such development,
protecting the property rights of neighboring landowners, and preserving the natural
environment.” 964 A.2d 869, 876 (Pa. 2009). Huntley’s view of Oil and Gas Act
preemption was subsequently applied in Penneco Oil v. County of Fayette. 4 A.3d 722, 732
(Pa. 2010) (“As in Huntley, we conclude that while there may be some overlap between the
goals of Fayette County’s Zoning Ordinance and the purposes set forth in the Act, the most
salient objectives underlying restrictions on oil and gas drilling in certain zoning districts
appears in Fayette County to be those pertaining to preserving the character of residential
neighborhoods, as well as each zoning district, and encouraging beneficial and compatible
land uses.”).
162
S. 1100, 2011 Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2011); H.R. 1950, 2011 Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2011).
163
See TERI OOMS ET. AL, EVOLUTION OF HB 1950 AND SB 1100—PENNSYLVANIA’S
MARCELLUS SHALE IMPACT FEE—AND ASSESSMENT OF HB 1950 (ACT 13), at 1, 3 (2012),
available
at
http://energy.wilkes.edu/PDFFiles/Act%2013%20Assessment%2003%2019%202012.pdf.
164
58 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2302 (2012). The lowest possible fee (with levels depending on
the price of natural gas) for a well in its first year of operation is $40,000, with fees
decreasing as the age of the well increases. Id.
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against shale drillers. 165
Specifically, under Act 13, Pennsylvania municipalities are granted the
right to impose impact fees on any wells operating in their jurisdiction. 166
These impact fees may be paired with municipal zoning ordinances, so long
as the ordinances do not infringe on the “reasonable development of oil and
gas.”167 Per section 3304 of the Act, “reasonable development” explicitly
authorizes “oil and gas operations—other than activities at impoundment
areas, compressor stations, and processing plants—as a permitted use in all
zoning districts.”168
Impoundment areas, compressor stations, and
processing plants are also allowed, with the appropriate setbacks from other
buildings.169
If the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission or a
Pennsylvania state court rules that a municipality is unreasonably restricting
development, the municipality will be unable to receive any of the impact
fee revenue until the ordinance is changed.170 Nor will a municipality
receive any revenue if it refuses to impose an impact fee. 171 The ultimate
goal, at least in the eyes of Pennsylvania’s Republican Governor, Tom
Corbett, is to use the impact fee as leverage for streamlining local laws in
the name of encouraging natural gas development and creating more jobs.172
Nevertheless, opponents of Act 13 still have hope. In July 2012, an
appellate panel of judges for the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
voted to enjoin the State from enforcing section 3304 of the Act on federal
165

See Thomas Y. Au, Op-Ed., Legislators Would be Wise to Start Over with Marcellus
Shale
Bill,
PENNLIVE
(Dec.
30,
2011,
5:30
AM),
http://www.pennlive.com/editorials/index.ssf/2011/12/legislators_would_be_wise_to_s.html;
Marc Levy, Associated Press, GOP Lawmakers Seek Vote on Pa. Drilling Bill, HUFFINGTON
POST (Feb. 5, 2012, 11:54 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/05/pennsylvanianatural-gas-drilling-bill_n_1255759.html; Marc Levy, Associated Press, Pennsylvania Act
13 Provisions Struck Down by Appellate Court, HUFFINGTON POST (July 26, 2012, 2:19 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/07/26/pennsylvania-act-13-naturalgas_n_1706822.html; Sandy Long, PA Legislation Could Trade Community Control for
Drilling
Fees,
RIVER
REP.
(Nov.
15,
2011),
http://www.riverreporteronline.com/news/14/2011/11/15/pa-legislation-could-tradecommunity-control-drilling-fees; Robert Swift, House, Senate Hammer Out Impact Fee
Bills, CITIZENS VOICE (Feb. 5, 2012), http://citizensvoice.com/news/house-senate-hammerout-impact-fee-bills-1.1267318#axzz1lVJfiCim.
166
58 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2302(a) (2012).
167
Id. § 3304.
168
Id. § 3304(b)(5).
169
Id. § 3304(b)(6)–(8).
170
Id. § 3308.
171
Id. § 2302.
172
See Long, supra note 165 (quoting the Governor as saying: “There are job creators
well down the supply chain in the Marcellus Shale industry who are waiting to see if
Pennsylvania will enact predicable and uniform standards before making capital investments
in the Commonwealth. I do not want to make these job creators, nor these potential capital
investments, wait any longer”).
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and state constitutional grounds. 173 Specifically, in Robinson Twp. v.
Commonwealth, the panel found that section 3304’s authorization of oil and
gas operations in all zoning districts violated the substantive due process of
Pennsylvania municipalities, as “it [did] not protect the interests of
neighboring property owners from harm, alter[ed] the character of
neighborhoods, and [made] irrational classifications” for what must be
included in zoning areas. 174 The ruling was seen as a win for local
governance and those opposed to further development of the Marcellus
Shale, and as a defeat for the Governor and the energy industry that he
appears to support.175
Predictably, proponents of Act 13 demanded a speedy review of the
Commonwealth Court’s decision by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.176
This review was held on October 17, 2012, with the Supreme Court
listening to nearly two hours of arguments both for and against Act 13 in a
hearing open to the public.177 There is no timeline for the court’s final
ruling, putting the future of the Pennsylvania Oil and Gas Act on hold once
again.178
ii. Delaware River Basin Commission
In contrast to the regulatory flux surrounding the Oil and Gas Act, the
policies of the Delaware River Basin Commission (DRBC), a non-federal,
interstate regulatory body, are at least for the time being a concrete obstacle
to Pennsylvania’s shale drillers. Created by the Delaware River Basin
Compact of 1961,179 the DRBC is “a regional body with the force of law”
tasked with regulating the portion of the Delaware River system located
within the Commission’s constituent states of Delaware, New Jersey, New
York, and Pennsylvania.180 There are five commissioners of the DRBC: the

173

Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 52 A.3d 463 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2012).
Id. at 484. The court went on to state: “If a municipality cannot constitutionally
include allowing oil and gas operations, it is no more constitutional just because the
Commonwealth requires that it be done.” Id. at 485.
175
See Levy, supra note 165.
176
Laura Olson, Pa. Officials Seek Review of Act 13 Shale Drilling Ruling, PITTSBURG
POST-G AZETTE
(Aug.
1,
2012,
12:16
AM),
http://www.postgazette.com/stories/local/marcellusshale/pa-officials-seek-review-of-act-31-shale-drillingruling-647058/.
177
Laura Olson, Justices Hear Opinions on Marcellus Shale Drilling Law, PITTSBURG
POST-G AZETTE
(Oct.
18,
2012,
12:04
AM),
http://www.postgazette.com/stories/local/marcellusshale/justices-hear-opinions-on-marcellus-shale-drillinglaw-657952/.
178
Id.
179
Delaware River Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 87-328, 75 Stat. 688 (1961).
180
About DRBC, DEL. RIVER BASIN COMM’N, http://www.nj.gov/drbc/about/ (last visited
Nov. 8, 2012).
174
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governor of each constituent state and the commander of the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers North Atlantic Division, who serves as the federal
representative. 181 The Delaware River Basin cuts through a wide swath of
central Pennsylvania that, importantly, is subject to an ongoing DRBC
moratorium on shale drilling. 182
Specifically, in May 2009, the DRBC banned any new shale gas
drilling in the Delaware River Basin without prior Commission approval,
while simultaneously announcing that no new approvals would be granted
until the Commission had adopted new rules governing approvals. 183
According to DRBC Executive Director Carol R. Collier, the genesis of the
moratorium was a concern with shale drilling’s effect on water quality.184
This concern was no doubt informed by the fact that the Delaware River
Basin is responsible for the water supply of over 15 million people,
including all of Philadelphia and half of New York City. 185
In this context, the DRBC issued draft fracking regulations in
December 2010.186 However, DRBC commissioners never voted on these
regulations, and a continuous flow of public comment and environmental
concern has kept votes on subsequent drafts from occurring. 187 The most
current DRBC draft regulations would allow for the drilling of a maximum
of 300 natural gas wells collectively between all energy companies
permitted to operate in the Delaware River Basin. 188 The vote on this draft
was postponed indefinitely from its already-delayed date of November 21,
2011, after Delaware Governor Jack Markell announced his intention to
join the state of New York in voting against the draft regulations. 189 In
postponing the vote, the DRBC claimed that it was allowing “additional
time for review by the five commission members.”190 It was an event that

181

Commissioners,
DEL.
RIVER
BASIN
COMM’N,
http://www.state.nj.us/drbc/about/commissioners/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2012).
182
Natural Gas Drilling Index Page, DEL. RIVER BASIN COMM’N,
http://www.state.nj.us/drbc/programs/natural/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2012).
183
McKay et al., supra note 127, at 131.
184
Id.
185
Associated Press, DRBC Tweaks Proposed Gas Drilling Regulations, WALL ST. J.
(Nov. 8, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/AP7f80ad53e651483eb2130415309ab5cb.html.
186
See McKay et al., supra note 127, at 131–32.
187
In postponing its vote over the latest iteration of draft regulations from October 21,
2011 to November 21, 2011, the DRBC noted that it had received 69,000 public submissions
and comments.
See Amanda Cregan, Vote Delayed on Drilling Regulations,
PHILLYBURBS.COM
(Oct.
9,
2011,
5:00
AM),
http://www.phillyburbs.com/my_town/new_hope/vote-delayed-on-drillingregulations/article_899fa507-e1dd-510a-b5d4-8a10480bf6a1.html.
188
Associated Press, supra note 185.
189
Gerken, supra note 53.
190
Press Release, Del. River Basin Comm’n, DRBC Postpones November 21 Special
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many anti-drilling activists considered a victory. 191
B. Alberta
1. Federal Laws
The Canadian Constitution gives the federal and provincial-level
governments differing authority when it comes to the oil and gas industry.
Specifically, provinces have the exclusive right to regulate their own nonrenewable natural resources, 192 while the federal government is responsible
for issues relating to “fisheries, shipping, interprovincial trade and
commerce, and criminal law.”193 Thus, the federal government’s ability to
regulate the environmental effects of the oil sands industry is constrained by
the Alberta provincial government’s constitutional authority.
i. Kyoto Protocol
Despite its constitutional constraints, the Canadian federal government
could have, at least in theory, reigned in the oil sands industry by regulating
greenhouse gas emissions pursuant to its obligations under the Kyoto
Protocol. Specifically, pursuant to Kyoto, Canada pledged to reduce its
greenhouse gas emissions to at least 6% below their 1990 levels by 2012.194
However, with compliance by the end of 2012 looking increasing
impossible given its emissions output, Canada in late 2011 announced it
was pulling out of the agreement, thereby limiting its impetus to regulate
the oil sands even further. 195

Meeting:
New
Meeting
Date
Still
to
be
Determined
(Nov.
18,
2011), http://www.nj.gov/drbc/home/newsroom/news/approved/20111118_newsrel_naturalg
as.html.
191
Gerken, supra note 53.
192
Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 92A (U.K.), reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, app.
II, no. 5 (Can.) (“In each province, the legislature may exclusively make laws in relation to
(a) exploration for non-renewable resources in the province; (b) development, conservation
and management of non-renewable resources and forestry resources in the province,
including laws in relation to the rate of primary production therefrom; and (c) development,
conservation and management of sites and facilities in the province for the generation and
production of electrical energy.”).
193
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GEN. OF CAN., 2011 OCTOBER REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER
OF THE ENVIRONMENT AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 63 (2011), available at
http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/docs/parl_cesd_201110_02_e.pdf; see also Constitution
Act c. 91.
194
Wood et al., supra note 98.
195
Ian Austen, Canada Announces Exit From Kyoto Climate Treaty, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
13, 2011, at A15 (“Canada could meet its commitment only through extreme measures, like
pulling all motor vehicles from its roads and shutting heat off to every building in the
country.”); see also Wood et al., supra note 98.
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The decision to abandon Kyoto came as a surprise to few, as in the
short term the Canadian government saved itself from at least $6 billion in
fines it would have accrued for non-compliance.196 Further, the move
reflected the long-held, anti-Kyoto stance of the country’s Conservative
Party, which currently controls the federal government.197 Indeed, ever
since coming into power in 2006, current Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s
government has been “overtly hostile” to Kyoto, instituting only “soft” proKyoto measures such as a Green Infrastructure Fund targeted at funding
public transit and other similar ventures. 198
Underlying the Harper administration’s attitude toward Kyoto and its
relationship to the oil sands is the concept of “ethical oil.”199 This concept
essentially posits that the oil produced in democratic countries such as
Canada is morally preferable to “conflict oil” produced in countries with
poor human rights records.200 The Canadian government planned to invoke
the “ethical oil” concept at a meeting of the Conference of the Parties, the
governing body of the Convention on Biological Diversity, 201 in order to
justify Canada’s heightened emissions.202 This suggests that there may be

196

$6 billion is the low estimate for the amount Canada would have owed, per the
Pembina Institute; the high estimate, per the Minister of the Environment Peter Kent, is $14
billion. Austen, supra note 195.
197
Kyoto was ratified under the rule of the opposing Liberal Party. Id.
198
Wood et al., supra note 98, at 1010. The Green Infrastructure Fund was created in
2009 and, per the Canadian government, is designed to support projects that “promote
cleaner air, reduced greenhouse gas emissions and cleaner water.” Green Infrastructure
Fund, INFRASTRUCTURE CAN., http://www.infrastructure.gc.ca/prog/gif-fiv-eng.html (last
visited Nov. 15, 2012). For reference, it should also be noted that the Liberal governments,
before current Prime Minister Harper, “were very slow to develop climate change policies
and failed to implement any significant measures before they lost office in 2006.” Wood et
al., supra note 98, at 1010.
199
See Egan, supra note 13. The concept of ethical oil was taken from a book recently
published by Ezra Levant. See EZRA LEVANT, ETHICAL OIL: THE CASE FOR CANADA’S OIL
SANDS (2010).
200
Trish Audette, Canada to Defend Oilsands at Conference; It’s All or Nothing in
Reducing Emissions, Minister Says, VICTORIA TIMES COLONIST, Nov. 27, 2011, at A11
(Can.), available at 2011 WLNR 24551024 (“The book essentially compares Canada’s
human rights record to those of other oil-producing countries, and argues Canada’s ‘ethical
oil’ is preferable to ‘conflict oil’ produced in countries with poor human rights records, such
as Sudan, Venezuela, Saudi Arabia or Iran. The argument removes environmental issues,
such as greenhouse gas emissions, from the equation, though Levant notes Alberta’s data on
environmental issues is more transparent than information shared by other countries.”).
201
Conference of the Parties (COP), CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY,
http://www.cbd.int/cop/ (last visited Nov. 27, 2011).
202
Audette, supra note 200. Interestingly, although the author of the book “Ethical Oil”
is not affiliated with the government, the government has been so supportive of the concept
of ethical oil that there has been some controversy over whether the website
www.ethicaloil.org is government-controlled or not. Id.
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little risk of federal regulation under the guise of emissions control at least
in the near future.
ii. Canadian Environmental Assessment Act
Repealed and subsequently re-enacted in mid-2012, the Canadian
Environmental Assessment Act (CEAA) gives the federal government a
somewhat limited degree of power over oil sands development. 203
Specifically, the purpose of the CEAA is to ensure that certain “designated
project[s]” carried out in Canada over which the federal government has
authority do not cause “significant adverse environmental effects.”204
These environmental effects are, however, limited to the federal
government’s direct authority over fish, other aquatic species, and
migratory birds, 205 since the federal government has no corresponding
constitutional authority to directly regulate non-renewable natural
resources.206 Moreover, the federal government cannot review types of
projects that have not been “designated” as reviewable by Canada’s
Minister of the Environment.207 Current Minister Peter Kent has limited
reviewable oil sands projects solely to the creation of new processing plants
producing over 10,000 cubic meters of oil per day, 208 the expansion of
existing processing plants by a production capacity of over 5,000 cubic
meters of oil per day,209 and the creation of new mines producing over
10,000 cubic meters of bitumen per day. 210
Upon its enactment, the new CEAA was seen by environmental groups
as more favorable to developers than its predecessor. 211 Beyond noting its
limitations for federal regulation of the oil sands sector, critics also focused
on new provisions that imposed strict time limits on the environmental
assessment process, a contemporaneous change to the Canadian Fisheries
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(Can.); see also Juliet Eilperin, Canadian Government Overhauling Environmental Rules to
Aid
Oil
Extraction,
WASH.
POST
(June
3,
2012),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/canadian-government-overhaulingenvironmental-rules-to-aid-oil-extraction/2012/06/03/gJQAyxx2BV_story.html.
204
Canadian Environmental Assessment Act s. 52, art. 4(1)(a).
205
See id. art. 5(1)(a)(i)–(iv);
206
See Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 91, 92A (U.K.), reprinted in R.S.C.
1985, app. II, no. 5 (Can.).
207
Canadian Environmental Assessment Act s. 52, art. 84(a).
208
Regulations Designating Physical Activities, SOR/2012-147, sch., para. 9(a) (Can.).
209
Id. para. 12.
210
Id. para. 9(b)
211
See, e.g., Eilperin, supra note 203; Chris Plecash, Feds Set to Release CEAA 2012
Regulations,
HILL
TIMES,
July
16,
2012,
at
20,
available
at
http://www.imperialoil.ca/Canada-English/operations_sands_kearl_overview.aspx
(last
visited Oct. 27, 2012).

422

Come Shale Away
33:393 (2013)
Act that narrowed its focus (and thus, the federal government’s ability to
protect fish via the CEAA) to solely “commercial, recreational and
aboriginal fisheries,” and a vast reduction in the federal budget for
environmental assessments. 212 While there has been successful proenvironmental litigation in at least one instance under the older iteration of
the CEAA,213 it remains to be seen if the newer version of the law will be
impacted in a similar manner.
iii. Tax Policy
Federal tax policy presents more of a threat to development than the
CEAA. Though, as discussed earlier, the federal government provided
accelerated cost recovery starting in the late 1990s to encourage oil sands
development, Stephen Harper’s Conservative administration has recently
indicated a willingness to be less generous with the industry in this
regard.214
Specifically, the Harper government introduced a proposed budget in
early 2011 that reduced the speed with which companies could write off
expenses relating to the acquisition of oil sands leases and the development
of new oil sands mines. 215 These rollbacks remained in the 2011 budget
and were not removed, 216 even after Harper’s re-election in May 2011.217
To pro-drilling sources—such as Alberta’s provincial government and the
oil sands industry’s trade group—such measures risked reducing the
financial appeal of oil sands development and moving the sector’s tax
treatment away from that of the mining industry, its closest analogue. 218
212

Plecash, supra note 211.
See Pembina Inst. for Appropriate Dev. v. Can., [2008] F.C. 302 (Can.), available at
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At the same time, however, Harper’s rollbacks did not appear to be a
complete deterrent to companies operating in the oil sands. First, oil sands
leases and mines acquired prior to March 22, 2011 were grandfathered in
under the previous, more favorable tax regime. 219 Second, many companies
operating in the oil sands were focusing on developing existing leases and
mines, and not necessarily on acquiring new assets. 220 Finally, for some
companies, tax treatment was not seen as the driving force in oil sands
investment, at least relative to the massive potential for future resource
development.221
Moreover, rollbacks aside, Harper did not indicate that constraining
Canada’s oil industry was on his agenda after winning the 2011 federal
election.222 This suggests that the pre-election Harper government seemed,
at most, to view the oil sands sector as a mature industry no longer needing
tax incentives to encourage investment.223 The main calculus in considering
the elimination of tax breaks, instead, seemed tied to the possibility of
boosting federal tax revenues by nearly C$3 billion over the next half
decade.224
2. Provincial/Local Laws
Canada’s Constitution proclaims that provinces have the exclusive
right to regulate their own non-renewable natural resources. 225 However,
this preferred status has not resulted in a consistent framework regulating
Alberta’s oil sands as, much like in Pennsylvania, provincial and municipal
interests have often clashed.
i. Resource Licensing
Regulation of oil sands development usually begins and ends with
Alberta’s provincial government.
Municipal governments are not
“consulted in any direct way when the provincial government sets its
energy policy, establishes land use plans for the province, disposes of rights
to develop Crown-owned oil and gas resources, or grants access to the
surface of public lands.”226 The provincial government’s control over the
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resource licensing process is significant, as it owns approximately 97% of
Alberta’s oil sands mineral rights. 227 In transferring these rights to potential
developers, the provincial government traditionally has not been legally
required to account for socio-economic or environmental concerns.228
Indeed, the process by which the provincial government transfers these
rights is seemingly devoid of normative factors; instead, the highest bidder
for advertised public oil and gas rights wins. 229
In exchange for access to the provincial oil and gas rights, developers
pay Alberta “[r]oyalties, bonus bid payments, and rents.”230 This system of
royalties illustrates where the loyalties of the Alberta government lie when
it comes to oil sands development and the environment. As discussed
earlier, in 1997 the Alberta government imposed a generous royalty regime
on oil sands projects in order to spur development in this sector. 231 While
royalties for the oil and gas industry overall were increased in 2007, and
thus made more punitive, this change was partially rolled back in early
2010.232 All in all, Alberta’s government seemingly viewed an increase in
economic activity as being worth a smaller piece of the pie. 233
ii. Energy Resources Conservation Board
Compared to the provincial government, Alberta’s citizens and local
governments are likely less disposed toward supporting oil and gas
development.234 Indeed, recently adopted oil and gas procedures for the
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city of Edmonton suggest that this sentiment exists even in Alberta’s capital
city:
These principles clearly summarize Edmonton’s concerns and are
indicative of the concerns of other municipalities as well. They are:
(a) ensuring the safety of the public, including the minimization and
prevention of risks to citizens’ health and well-being; (b) enabling
the citizens of Edmonton to enjoy the best possible quality of life
(social, health, economic, and environmental); (c) minimizing and
managing nuisances from oil and gas activities (“including noise,
odours, dust, glare, traffic and aesthetic concerns”); (d) ensuring that
oil and gas activity does not negatively affect the City’s ability to
undertake urban development; (e) ensuring that the City’s
environmental policies (for example, the prevention of pollution) are
achieved in conjunction with oil and gas development; (f) ensuring
that the development of city infrastructure and oil and gas resources
is balanced with protecting health, safety, and the interests of
citizens.235

Accordingly, it seems reasonably clear that municipal interests are not
always aligned with those of Alberta’s provincial government.
Though opportunities do exist for municipalities to voice their
concerns in a legally binding manner, these avenues do not appear to be
particularly fruitful. One such avenue deals with the approval of oil and gas
projects. Although Alberta has the exclusive power to grant oil and gas
rights to private owners, it at times has to take into account the input of
outside parties when approving discrete oil and gas projects. Here, the
relevant provincial entity is the Energy Resources Conservation Board
(ERCB), which has the power to approve projects so long as they benefit
not just the project’s applicant but also Alberta’s residents in general.236
If a municipality objects to a specific approval, it may call for a public
hearing so long as its rights are “directly and adversely” affected by the
approval.237 This requirement, however, has been particularly difficult for
municipalities to meet.238 Moreover, in most cases municipalities will not
be entitled to cost recovery when participating in a public hearing, which
financially discourages their participation. 239
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235
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iii. Municipal Government Act
Another regulatory option, at least in theory, for local governments is
Alberta’s Municipal Government Act (MGA), which grants municipalities
power to exercise control over land use and development within their
boundaries.240 However, section 618 of the MGA specifically prohibits
municipalities from determining the use of oil and gas wells, batteries, and
pipelines within their territories. 241 This reflects the Alberta legislature’s
general view that “as the lifeblood of Alberta’s economy,” oil and gas
operations should “not be subjected to local control that might vary from
place to place.”242
Section 619 of the MGA gives municipalities some degree of power,
allowing local governments to regulate elements of the oil sands industry
not explicitly mentioned in section 618.243 Yet, local government authority
is once again severely constrained in application, as municipalities may not
regulate an infrastructure item falling under section 619 that the ERCB has
previously dealt with in one of its own approvals. 244 Thus, the MGA,
though seemingly applicable to development within municipalities, is likely
to be only a minimal hurdle for oil sands drillers to overcome.
iv. Alberta Land Stewardship Act
The MGA aside, municipalities may also now take advantage of the
recently enacted Alberta Land Stewardship Act (ALSA). 245 The ALSA
grants Alberta’s Lieutenant Governor in Council the power to create
subdivisions within the province and “regional plans” regulating land use in
these areas.246 As of late 2012, the Alberta government has created seven
planning areas.247 Although the Lieutenant Governor has “exclusive and
final jurisdiction” over the contents of each regional plan, 248 he or she may
create “regional advisory councils” in each planning area to help with the
creation and implementation of the plan.249 Members of a regional advisory
council can include, among others, municipal officials. 250
240
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The regional development guidelines created with the help of the
Regional Advisory Councils have the force of law in that they must be
taken into account by other license-granting bodies within the provincial
government.251 This means that the provincial government must now make
sure that any disposition of oil and gas resources complies with any
development restrictions imposed by regional plans. 252 Similarly, the
ERCB must now take heed of regional plans when approving energy
projects.253 This is a significant change—one that departs from the
regulatory regime described above and has the potential to swing the power
dynamic in favor of municipalities.
The Lower Athabasca Regional Plan (LARP), the regional plan
covering the location of the oil sands, was announced on August 22, 2012,
and took effect on September 1, 2012. Though its impact on the province’s
overall regulatory scheme remains unclear,254 a review of the language of
the LARP yields several important details about the province’s posture
towards the oil sands going forward. First, the LARP is a ten-year plan,
with the province reserving the right to update it every five years. 255 The
LARP’s “Strategic Plan” for the future references economic development
first, and specifically lists goals such as increasing the yield of oil sands
recovery and “optimizing the economic potential of the resource,” albeit in
“ways that are environmentally sustainable and socially acceptable.”256 The
LARP’s “Vision for the Lower Athabasca Region” echoes its Strategic
Plan, mentioning the desire to “support development of the region and its
oil sands reserves” before noting the importance of the region’s “air, water,
land[,] and biodiversity.”257
This is not to say that the LARP is devoid of regulatory specifics,
however. Rather, the LARP authorizes the government to set legally
binding triggers and limits for a variety of chemical compounds for the
purpose of maintaining air and water quality.258 The LARP also increases
conservation land in the region by more than 1.5 million hectares,
protecting approximately 22% of Lower Athabasca, including preexisting
251
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conservation land, from any development. 259 This land includes 340,000
hectares of presumably viable territory already controlled by oil and gas
companies.260 Importantly, the LARP’s conservation efforts appear to have
gained preliminary support from the influential Pembina Institute, which
lauded Alberta’s government for its efforts and called the LARP a
“promising start” to “responsible oil sands development.”261
Nevertheless, the energy industry does not appear to be particularly
deterred by the LARP.262 For one, the final version of the LARP included
an important concession to developers, reducing the amount of
economically viable conservation land by more than 31,000 hectares over
earlier versions of the Plan.263 Moreover, much of the land protected by the
LARP and its non-binding draft versions is located far from the oil sands’
home base of Fort McMurray, in areas with “little or no industrial
activity.”264 Finally, since the terms of reference for the LARP were
released in mid-2009,265 there has been only an uptick in commercial
interest in the oil sands, as evidenced by the flurry of recent merger activity
discussed earlier.
v. Alberta’s Emissions Controls
Finally, Alberta’s government has tried to regulate the oil and gas
industry through greenhouse gas emissions rules. The foundational
elements in Alberta’s scheme are the Climate Change and Emissions
Management Act (CCEMA),266 the CCEMA’s accompanying Specified Gas
Emitters Regulation, 267 and Alberta’s 2008 Climate Change Strategy. 268
The Specified Gas Emitters Regulation, enacted in 2007,
supplemented the CCEMA by requiring already-existing facilities emitting
over 100,000 tonnes of greenhouse gases to both reduce emissions intensity
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by 12% in 2007 and maintain reduced emissions in the future. 269 Emissions
intensity, as opposed to emissions in absolute terms, refers to total
emissions created per one unit of production. 270 Thus, emissions intensity
can theoretically be reduced while overall emissions are actually increased.
Regardless, in cases of non-compliance, offenders must buy credits from
one of three sources: emitters in the same industry that have reduced
emissions by more than the required amount (thus earning the credits),
emitters in other industries that have done the same (these credits are
technically called “offsets”), or the Alberta government itself, at a rate of
C$15 per non-compliant tonne donated into an Alberta-based technology
fund.271
Alberta’s 2008 Climate Change Strategy (2008 Strategy) was created
in the context of the regulations above, and in response to the strong
likelihood that Alberta would not meet its own provincial obligations under
the Kyoto Protocol.272 The 2008 Strategy is not legally binding, but is
rather an aspirational document aimed at setting the stage for future
action.273 Its primary goal is to mitigate emissions through efficient energy
usage, carbon capture and sequestration, and greening energy production. 274
Overall, the 2008 Strategy aims to reduce net greenhouse gas
emissions by fifty megatonnes by 2020, and by 200 megatonnes over
business as usual levels by 2050.275 Carbon capture and sequestration
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technology is a key part of the program’s hopes—the 2008 Strategy relies
on the technology for 70% of projected greenhouse gas emission reductions
by 2050.276
Ultimately, however, the emissions reductions contemplated by the
2008 Strategy do not necessarily present a significant impediment to future
oil sands development. The 2008 Strategy, after all, does not itself prohibit
current and future oil sands projects; it only sets net reduction targets.
Similarly, the CCEMA only requires a reduction in emissions intensity.
Thus, the province’s ability to meet its projected targets relies just as much
on technology and an increase in emissions efficiency as it does on limiting
future oil sands development. This increase in efficiency does not appear
illusory; the emissions intensity of the oil sands industry fell by 29%
between 1990 and 2009, before increasing by 2% between 2009 and
2012.277 The industry is confident that per-barrel greenhouse gas emissions
will fall to the level of conventional oil drilling within the next ten to fifteen
years.278
IV. DISCUSSION: COMPARING FOSSIL FUEL REGULATION IN
PENNSYLVANIA AND ALBERTA
Having addressed many of the major regulatory hurdles to
unconventional fossil fuel extraction in Pennsylvania and Alberta, this
Comment asks in this Part which of these venues would be more attractive
to a hypothetical, resource-agnostic energy company looking for drilling
opportunities. To reach a conclusion in this regard, this Comment seeks to
differentiate how the regulatory regimes discussed in Part III treat their
respective natural resources.
This is not to suggest that Pennsylvania and Alberta’s regimes are
polar opposites, however. These regulatory regimes are far more similar
than they are different. On the whole, it is safe to say that favorable,
business-friendly conditions for drilling exist in each region.
The federal governments in the United States and Canada, for instance,
are relatively supportive of the unconventional oil and gas industry. 279
Federal regulations in both countries generally appear to be tolerant of the
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methods used to extract these fossil fuels from the ground. 280
Unconventional fossil fuel extraction also enjoys the support of the
state/provincial governments of both regions.281
Further, state and provincial governments in both regions are moving
to limit the power of municipalities to regulate the oil and gas activities
occurring within their borders. In Alberta, local governments have trouble
using the Energy Resources Conservation Board (ERCB) to appeal specific
oil sands approvals, 282 and are essentially barred from using the Municipal
Government Act (MGA) to limit development. 283 While the Alberta Land
Stewardship Act (ALSA) in theory allows for a regional voice in planning
oil sands development, the language of the Lower Athabasca Regional Plan
(LARP) still seems to favor the energy sector above all else. 284 The
situation is similar, albeit more tenuous, in Pennsylvania, where the passage
and potential enforcement of Act 13 threatens the progress made by
municipal governments via the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s 2009 ruling
in Huntley & Huntley v. Council of Oakmont. In any case, in both
Pennsylvania and Alberta, the local constituencies that are typically most
concerned with the negative impact of oil and gas extraction are seeing their
authority threatened.285
Nevertheless, regulation is not identical in Pennsylvania and Alberta.
Differences in status quo regulatory schemes do exist, as do differences in
attitude among certain regulatory actors. This Comment contends that these
issues lead to three primary regulatory divergences between the two
regions.
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A. There is a Greater Risk of Increased Federal Regulation in the United
States than in Canada
Although the federal governments of the United States and Canada
seem favorably disposed towards the unconventional fossil fuel industry,
there may be greater risk of increased federal control over the extraction
process in the United States. The possibility of increased federal control is
driven by the actions of two entities: the EPA and U.S. Congress.
The EPA likely has the ability to spur increased federal regulation by
finding a concrete link between hydraulic fracturing and water
contamination. An initial progress report on its study of the subject is due
in late 2012.286 Though many of the EPA’s recent actions287 have suggested
that it may be pessimistic (or even indifferent) about fracking’s relationship
with water quality, the Agency’s own testing has already begun to establish
such a relationship.288 Moreover, in April 2012 the EPA gave notice of its
intent to regulate fracking under the Clean Air Act, issuing rules that will be
fully implemented by 2015.289 Among other things, oil and gas wells must
now have equipment able to capture escaping volatile organic compound
emissions.290 While major drillers do not view the EPA’s “green
completion” requirement as a huge burden,291 its mere existence does
suggest that the EPA may now be ready to further regulate fracking.
If the EPA does establish a connection between fracking and
groundwater contamination, Congress may be inclined to revisit amending
the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) through passage of the Fracturing
Responsibility and Awareness of Chemicals Act (FRAC Act).292 If the
FRAC Act were to pass, its impact on shale gas drillers would likely be
significant. The cost of compliance with EPA permitting requirements and
inspections could reach as a high as $100,000 per new well drilled.293
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Permitting under the SDWA could also duplicate permitting at the state
level, wasting a driller’s time and resources. 294 Finally, the SDWA’s citizen
suit provision could cause headaches for drillers, as they would be exposed
to the threat of “litigation, injunction[,] or other delay tactics” from those
opposed to shale drilling. 295 Though passage of the FRAC Act is unlikely,
the risk of regulation under the SDWA is an outcome a driller may want to
avoid if given the choice.
Regardless, the mere existence of the FRAC Act suggests that the
chances of increased federal regulation in the United States are higher than
those in Canada, which is constrained both politically and constitutionally.
Politically, the Harper administration has only made oil sands extraction
easier by pulling out of the Kyoto Protocol and generally taking a favorable
stance to the oil sands industry in spite of changes to the tax code.
Constitutionally, the federal government cannot pass laws that directly
regulate non-renewable resources.296 Rather, it is limited to regulating the
oil sands under the re-enacted Canadian Environmental Assessment Act
(CEAA), which is more favorable to development than its predecessor.297
Thus, at the federal level, drillers are likely to face higher regulatory hurdles
in the United States.
B. Restrictive Municipal Regulation is a Greater Threat in Pennsylvania
than it is in Alberta
As mentioned previously, provincial regulation in Alberta via the
ERCB, MGA, and ALSA places shackles on rulemaking at the local level.
Though the LARP created under the ALSA has not had sufficient time to
fully impact local communities, its language and general non-interference
with land used for oil sands extraction suggests that it is predominately a
pro-industry document.298 Moreover, the LARP has gained some degree of
support from the influential Pembina Institute.299 This suggests that there
actually may be few local objections (at least in the environmental arena) to
Alberta’s treatment of the oil sands, at least at this point.
Environmental objections to shale drilling in Pennsylvania, on the
other hand, are both numerous and fierce.300 Using zoning powers currently
supported by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Huntley,301
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municipalities have created local laws that make drilling confusing and
potentially unprofitable for shale drillers.302 Though such provisions are
perhaps of dubious legality, municipalities have even attempted to enact
outright bans of shale drilling within their borders.303
Of course, many of these regulatory hurdles will disappear if
Pennsylvania’s Supreme Court reverses Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth
and the State is allowed to implement section 3304 of Act 13. This
provision, when combined with the impact fees instituted by Act 13, gives
the Pennsylvania Oil and Gas Act a carrot-and-stick character that both
encourages local governments to drop anti-shale zoning laws in exchange
for revenue, and punishes these governments for failing to comply. Though
some municipalities will inevitably hold out, the parts of Pennsylvania
capable of receiving a great deal of impact fee revenue seem likely to fall in
line with the state’s pro-drilling agenda. 304

302

Maher, supra note 52.
A municipal ban on shale drilling would prevent the reasonable development of oil
and gas resources and thus violate section 3304 of Act 13. 58 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3304
(2012). If Robinson Twp. is upheld, however, the issue of a ban’s legality becomes closer.
Particularly at issue is section 10603 of the Pennsylvania Municipal Planning Code, which
requires that local zoning ordinances “provide for the reasonable development of minerals in
each municipality.” 53 PA. CONS. STAT. § 10603(i) (2012). Range Resources, a prominent
driller in Pennsylvania, has already challenged a municipal ban on these grounds, although
this case has yet to be resolved. Andrea Iglar, South Fayette Challenge to Drilling Rules
Heads to Court, PITTSBURG POST-G AZETTE (Jan. 19, 2012, 5:08 AM), http://www.postgazette.com/pg/12019/1204337-55-0.stm?cmpid=marcellusshale.xml. A similar ban in the
city of Pittsburgh has already drawn the ire of Pennsylvania’s Public Utilities Commission.
Laura Olson & Joe Smydo, PUC Says Pittsburgh’s Ban on Natural Gas Extraction Conflicts
with State Law, PITTSBURG POST-G AZETTE (Sep. 11, 2012, 2:37 PM), http://www.postgazette.com/stories/local/neighborhoods-city/puc-says-pittsburghs-ban-on-natural-gasextraction-conflicts-with-state-law-652858/#ixzz26CWnyggO.
Nevertheless, moratoriums remain a threat to drillers. In 2011, referendums to ban
drilling appeared on ballots in State College, Peters Township, and Warren. Janice
Crompton, Bid to Ban Drilling in Peters is Defeated; Voters in State College Succeed,
PITTSBURG POST-G AZETTE
(Nov. 9, 2011, 12:35 AM), http://www.postgazette.com/pg/11313/1188498-503.stm. The referendum passed in State College, though
this region is less relevant to current Marcellus Shale drillers due to its proximity to the
lower-lying Utica Shale play, which is being developed mainly in Ohio. See Utica Shale Oil
Play Update, SEEKING ALPHA (Sept. 8, 2011), http://seekingalpha.com/article/292408-uticashale-oil-play-update. The referendums in Peters Township and Warren failed, primarily
due to public concern over the economic ramifications of such measures. Crompton, supra
note 303.
304
See, e.g., Laura Olson, Pa. Could Withhold South Fayette’s Impact Fee Revenue,
PITTSBURG POST-G AZETTE (Oct. 19, 2012, 12:17 AM), http://www.postgazette.com/stories/local/marcellusshale/pa-could-withold-south-fayettes-impact-feerevenue-658235/. While South Fayette is willing to forgo about $2,700 in impact fee
revenue for the sake of maintaining tight regulations, it remains to be seen if other
municipalities are willing to sacrifice checks from the state government at least one-hundred
303

435

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

33:393 (2013)

Nevertheless, Pennsylvania drillers cannot yet count on a predictable,
business-friendly regulatory environment paid for by Act 13 impact fees.
Instead, entrants into the region must deal with a status quo of inconsistent
local regulation, as well as a ban on drilling throughout much of central
Pennsylvania courtesy of the Delaware River Basin Commission (DRBC).
Much like the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s pending decision in Robinson
Twp., there is no set timeline for a vote on the DRBC’s draft regulations.305
This puts drilling in Pennsylvania in a true state of flux—a situation that is
likely less attractive to a resource-agnostic developer than the prospect of
drilling in Alberta.
C. Worst-Case Regulatory Scenarios: Outright Drilling Ban in
Pennsylvania vs. Emissions Limits in Alberta
The DRBC’s moratorium on drilling and the pending appeal in
Robinson Twp. illustrate the dangerous potential endgame for drillers in the
Marcellus Shale. In the worst-case scenario for these drillers, the DRBC
ban would continue indefinitely, and Robinson Twp. would be upheld. The
very possibility of gas drilling in many parts of Pennsylvania would then be
imperiled by either the DRBC moratorium or municipalities that once again
have the license to use zoning laws to severely limit fracking within their
borders. In other words, the worst-case scenario would be a reversion to,
and most likely an extension of, the state’s current regulatory uncertainty.
As a general matter, no such risk exists in Alberta. While the LARP
reserves 340,000 hectares (or 3,400 square kilometers) of commercially
viable oil sands for conservation,306 this is only a small percentage of the
149,000 square kilometers of oil sands located in Alberta. 307 For all intents
and purposes, the most stringent limitation of the daily extraction and
processing of oil sands are greenhouse gas emissions intensity limits set by
the Alberta Specified Gas Emitters Regulation. If a driller has exceeded its
emissions intensity limit under this law, it in theory will at least have to
partially stop drilling.
However, because this law regulates emissions intensity and not
absolute emissions, drillers can continue increasing oil sands extraction
output so long as they emit greenhouse gasses more efficiently. 308
Currently, the oil sands industry is confident in its ability to increase this
efficiency.309 This suggests that on some level the Specified Gas Emitters
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Regulation is no real barrier to oil sands extraction at all.
Moreover, even if drillers fail to comply with the Specified Gas
Emitters Regulation’s emissions intensity targets, they can still continue to
emit as much greenhouse gas as they want. All they have to do to
compensate for these emissions is buy credits or pay a C$15 fine for each
non-compliant tonne of greenhouse gas emitted. 310 A fine of this size does
not appear to be a deterrent to continued oil sands extraction. 311 Nor is the
fine high enough to incentivize drillers to lower emissions through an
investment in the carbon capture and sequestration technology favored by
the Alberta 2008 Strategy.312 Further, there is no indication that the fee will
ever increase, as Alberta does not appear inclined to antagonize the oil
sands industry thriving within its borders. 313
V. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, this Comment concludes that a hypothetical energy
company indifferent to investing in Alberta’s oil sands or Pennsylvania’s
shale would be better served by choosing the former, based solely on the
relative business friendliness of its federal, provincial, and local regulatory
scheme. Alberta’s business friendliness relative to Pennsylvania manifests
itself in three primary ways.
First, there is less risk of increased federal regulation of
unconventional fossil fuel extraction in Canada, compared to the United
States. Second, Alberta’s current provincial laws leave less room for
potentially unfavorable local-government rulemaking than do the state laws
of Pennsylvania. Finally, there is little risk of an outright ban on oil sands
extraction in Canada, while the risk of a ban is higher in Pennsylvania. For
all intents and purposes, the regulation with the most potential to shut down
Alberta’s oil sands operations—the Specified Gas Emitters Regulation—is
not much of a threat to development. Thus, an energy company looking to
invest in North America’s unconventional fossil fuel revolution would be
well served to invest in Alberta and its oil sands.
This is not to say that Pennsylvania is overtly hostile to investment in
the status quo, however. Despite the regulatory uncertainty surrounding the
EPA’s study of fracking and water quality, the DRBC’s ban on fracking in
central Pennsylvania, and the conflict between municipal zoning ordinances
and the state’s support for the oil and gas industry, drillers continue to flood
the region. Yet, when given a choice to invest in Pennsylvania or Alberta
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with all other issues held equal, one cannot ignore this uncertainty and its
potential implications for development. Perhaps Pennsylvania will become
more attractive when the EPA releases its final study on fracking, or when
Pennsylvania’s Supreme Court decides the fate of Act 13. For now,
however, Alberta appears to be the safer, more business friendly option.
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